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THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND LATIN
AMERICA - PARTY, PEOPLE, AND STATE
RELATIONSHIPS

A Thesis Presented to
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by
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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines various theoretical concepts in the study of international relations, and postulates a model for the study of inter-relationships between the People's Republic of China and Latin America. This model concentrates on three vital interfaces: state to state, party to party, and people to people contacts between China and Latin America.

Due to its unique position, Cuba is excluded from the study except for its impact on other nations.

Four hypotheses are posed. These are:

- (1) If the People's Republic of China-Latin American state to state relationships increase, then party to party relationships will decrease.
- (2) Obversely, if state to state relationships decrease, party to party relationship will increase.
- (3) If state to state relations increase, there will be an increase in people to people programs.
- (4) Obversely, if party relationships increase, there will be a decrease in people to people programs.

The remainder of the thesis consists of a detailed examination of the three interfaces described above, with emphasis on the period 1960-1972. This examination reveals

that the People's Republic of China has, at different times, emphasized each of the three approaches, but never to the complete exclusion of the others.

Conclusions reached by this study are that hypotheses one and two are supported by the data reviewed. Findings regarding hypotheses three and four are less distinct, although the preponderance of data tend to support them. Re-examination at some future time, benefiting from an improved perspective, may conclusively affirm or deny these latter hypotheses.

Other findings of this study are that Chinese activities in Latin America have been motivated by events taking place elsewhere on the international scene, and not by any special interest or relationship between the People's Republic of China and the various Latin American nations.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To my wife, whose coffee, care, and criticism are hopefully rewarded and my children, whose forbearance has been remarkable.

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CHAPTER I

CONCEPTS AND MODEL-BUILDING

INTRODUCTION

This study will attempt to construct and apply a model of the People's Republic of China's relationships with Latin America.

Initially, various approaches will be examined for the purpose of determining their strengths and weaknesses, and one approach will be selected upon which to formulate a model and draw several hypotheses for testing.

How does a student conceptualize such a problem in international relations? What framework can he utilize to examine a specific action or event? A cursory examination of the literature would seem to offer a flood of solutions to the problem: Behavioralist, traditional, quantitative, decision-making, historical dynamics, policy-oriented, national interest, "value-free," and on and on. Some authors in the field would even state, as does Harold C. Hinton, that they proceed "on the basis of no general theory of social or political action; I find most such theories vague and pretentious."¹

¹Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966), p. viii.

A critical response to Hinton's view might be that every political scientist, whether he be a budding student or a blooming academician, proceeds in line with some theory or conceptualization of the real world, otherwise the quest for knowledge becomes chaotic. Whether or not that conceptualization is implicit or explicit is another matter.

Regardless of the approach adopted, it is bound to have certain limitations. Indeed, as one scholar puts it:

All writing about foreign policy which is not theoretical and abstract is a collection of approximations to the truth incompletely assessed on the basis of inadequate evidence.²

Thus, the task becomes one of trying to select that approach that seems to offer the best chance of solving whatever question the author is attempting to investigate, and provide as many relevant facts, lucidly presented, and assessed as validly and as objectively as possible.

This problem of conceptualization and approach would seem to become more difficult as the level of esoteria increases. A student of the American political process would have not only his own inclinations to guide him, but the welcome and reassuring

²T. B. Millar, "On Writing About Foreign Policy," in International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed., James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 58.

trail blazed by the hundreds who had preceded him. However adventurous he might become, he can rest assured that he could always wend his way back to one of many well traveled trails within the discipline. The student of international problems does not always have that same assurance.

However, to conclude that no valid approaches to the study of international problems exist is to present too gloomy a picture. The fact that the field of inquiry is new does not preclude the use of whatever available tools exist for the examination of its phenomena.

Even if, as Hans Morgenthau states

"International relations is another word for recent and contemporary history. History, however, is the domain of the contingent, the accidental, the unpredictable, and insofar as it is that, it cannot be comprehended by theoretical means."³

some means and methods must exist for the student to explore even the most recondite of matters affecting international relations. Approaches do exist. The remainder of this paper will examine some of the more common, as applied to a particular question in the international relations field, and attempt to construct a feasible model for further testing.

³Hans Morgenthau, Saturday Review, January 7, 1967, quoted in Henry Howe Ransom, "International Relations," The Journal of Politics, (May 1968), 349.

CHINA AND LATIN AMERICA: MODEL I

Now, the question: How can we accurately describe and explain the People's Republic of China's relationship with Latin America? Assuming that this basic question can be answered, at least to a certain level of satisfaction, can we then move to the other generally accepted tasks of scholarship in international relations, that is, evaluation, prediction, and prescription?⁴ What framework will have the most utility in answering such a question?

For the sake of simplicity, no attempt will be made to deal with all possible approaches. Graham T. Allison's Rational Policy Model (Model I), Organizational Process Model (Model II), and Bureaucratic Politics Model (Model III), would seem to offer fertile ground for exploration, as do John P. Lovell's Historical Dynamic, Strategic, and Decision-making Perspectives.⁵ Some additional approaches will also be considered.

⁴See John P. Lovell, Foreign Policy in Perspective (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. 13, and also Arnold Brecht, "Scientific Operations and Scientific Justification," in The Conduct of Political Inquiry, Louis D. Hayes and Ronald D. Hedlund, eds., (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 60.

⁵Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," in Comparative Foreign Policy, Wolfram F. Hanrieder, ed., (New York: David McKay, 1971), pp. 322-384.

An examination of the People's Republic of China activities in Latin America in terms of Model I (Rational Policy Model), offers several immediate advantages. If the analogy that international relations can be compared to a gigantic game of chess is as true as Allison implies, then all activities assume a certain homeomorphic logic. If all moves in the game are, as Allison states, "the more or less purposive acts of unified national governments," the conceptualization is both simplified and broadened.⁶ Using this approach, the People's Republic of China can be assumed to have certain broad policy objectives in its dealings with the many Latin American governments. These, in turn, can be examined to explain the national purposes which lie behind the policies, and hopefully to gain some measure of predictive authority about what course these actions will assume in the future. If any action taken by the Republic of China in regard to its Latin American policy is rational, as the model hypothesizes, then there must be some underlying rational policy or group of policies that cause the single discrete act to occur. The use of the model may lead us from this level even deeper into a glimpse of the underlying "world view" that the Chinese currently hold, at least about this section of the globe.

Thus, the path might lead from a specific event (i. e., the dispatch or recall of an ambassador) to an implicit or explicit

⁶ Allison, "Cuban Missile Crisis," p. 2.

policy (increasing representation abroad) to a national objective (representation in the United Nations) to a national goal (increased influence in world affairs expressed through international bodies).

Use of a model of this nature would certainly simplify the approach to the problem. All People's Republic of China actions in Latin America could be assumed to have some rational general purpose, with these purposes directed toward the attainment of national/ideological goals.

All individual actions to attain these goals would be conceived to be part of an overall scheme; cohesive, comprehensive, and functional. The state (People's Republic of China) acting as the role player on its side of the chess board, would be viewed as dealing with other states, individually or collectively, on the other side. Tactics and strategy in the contest would be equated to how the game is played, and for what purposes. As Allison states: "Governments select the action that will maximize strategic goals and objectives."⁷

The state as a monolith, dealing with other monoliths, would certainly seem to be a viable conceptualization, particularly if a "balance of power" function was to be examined or explained. Variables that would seem particularly applicable here would include such strategic and geopolitical factors as military strength,

⁷ Allison, "Cuban Missile Crisis," p. 332.

demands for material resources, and spatial relationships of the players involved. This is comparable to Lovell's concept of the strategic perspective, with a primary focus on broad patterns of continuity and change or a series of decisions.⁸ However, certain problems with this approach are readily apparent. One does not have to be a Sinologist to be aware of the fact that the People's Republic of China does not necessarily speak with one voice, at least internally. Recent events of the still continuing, although recently quiescent Cultural Revolution, point out the turmoil that exists under (and sometimes above) the surface in the Government of the People's Republic.

Also, the special nature of Mao's Communism might create problems. The overwhelming stress of Chinese/Marxist ideology complicates China's relationships with other nation-states, in a manner similar to that of the Soviet Union, but with its own nuances and subtleties.

Relationships between the People's Republic of China and its distant neighbors in Latin America are indeed different than between Japan and Latin America, for instance. The Chinese concept of "foreign relations" includes variables not present in analysis of a non-communist nation-state. If we accept Joseph I. Lee's thesis that "The main goal of Communist China in Latin America is to

⁸Lovell, Foreign Policy in Perspective, p. 57.

establish ideological leadership over the revolutionary movements in the area,"⁹ then we are talking about a different type of policy than if we are conceptualizing about most other non-communist nations in their dealings with one another.

However, the rational policy model would still have relevancy because if a nation performed an act, it must have had ends toward which that action was directed.¹⁰ As Lovell points out, such a perspective would draw heavily on military strategy, economic theory, particularly as it relates to maximum utility, and game theory.¹¹

It would seem that such an approach to the problem of understanding People's Republic of China policy and actions toward Latin America would offer a great measure of utility, particularly when contrasted with disadvantages of some other approaches.

MODEL II

Allison's Model II (Organizational Process) can best be defined as a concept which views all policies or actions as outputs, resulting from the interaction of organizations which comprise the government.

⁹Joseph I. Lee, "The Communist China's Latin American Policy," Government of Communist China, George P. Jan, ed., (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1966), p. 601.

¹⁰Allison, "Cuban Missile Crisis," p. 333.

¹¹Lovell, Foreign Policy in Perspective, p. 58. Other writers question the role that game theory plays, in any actual sense, in this concept.

The actors are, in his words,

a constellation of loosely allied organizations on top of which government leaders sit. This constellation acts only as component organizations perform functions.¹²

It compares, in most ways at least, to Lovell's "Decision-making" perspective in that each are primarily concerned with the organizational process and procedures which finally result in policy.¹³ In this view, policy is shaped in three critical ways by organizational structure. These are:

- (1) The actual occurrence itself is an organizational process. Organizational routines which cause things to happen are triggered by decisions of the leaders.
- (2) Options open to leaders to make decisions are restricted by the existence or non-existence of organizations to carry out those decisions.
- (3) Situations are structured by the existence of previous and on-going organizational outputs.¹⁴

If this model could be successfully applied to the People's Republic of China's relationship to Latin America, it would cast a revealing light on not only actions, but the processes behind those actions. However, difficulties would be numerous. The

¹² Allison, "Cuban Missile Crisis," p. 344.

¹³ cf. Lovell, Foreign Policy in Perspective, pp. 58-59.

¹⁴ Allison, "Cuban Missile Crisis," pp. 343-344.

lack of accurate information about organizational structure within the People's Republic of China would be a great and perhaps insurmountable handicap. Assuming that resource materials from within China were available, how would the observer-scholar compensate for built-in ideological bias, both on his part and in the materials used? Scrutiny of sources such as Red Flag, People's Daily, or Peking Review would seem to obscure as much as illuminate. Chinese "official" versions do not always coincide with a factual examination of phenomena. Organizing concepts cited by Allison in this regard clearly present difficulties. When such things as organizational actors, functionalist power, action as organizational output, central coordination and control are cited, it is assumed that they are examinable. Such is not the case for the foreign "outsider" looking at the People's Republic of China.¹⁵ This model could be made to work only if much more was known about the internal Communist China than is presently available to most students. Turmoil and conflict, "masses" versus "party chieftains," "right revisionists" versus "left revisionists" have been the hallmarks of most of what is known about these internal organizational workings. This area of research certainly would and does contribute to a knowledge of China, but would it offer direct help to a quest for knowledge of the People's Republic of China foreign policy?

¹⁵ See Allison, "Cuban Missile Crisis," pp. 244-349 for a complete enumeration of organizing concepts.

All in all, Model II might be very useful, particularly in its power of explanation for external acts as a result of internal organization, but it would have to be realistically assessed as difficult in the extreme, and with slight assurance of success in view of present knowledge about the role of organizations within the People's Republic of China.

MODEL III

Model III (Bureaucratic Politics) is yet another way to look at events in the area of foreign policy. Here, the central paradigm is that policy is a political outcome, and that the decisions and actions of governments result from competition and compromise within that government. Allison speaks of "chiefs" and "Indians," as well as "ad hoc" players in this political game.¹⁶

When a nation takes an action,

that action was the outcome of bargaining among individuals and groups within the government. That outcome included results achieved by groups committed to a decision or action, resultants which emerged from bargaining among groups with quite different positions, and foul-ups. /The Model's/ explanatory policy is achieved by revealing the pulling and hauling of various players. . . .¹⁷

¹⁶ Allison, "Cuban Missile Crisis," pp. 363-364.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 368. Emphasis in the original.

This conceptualization is roughly parallel to that offered by Lovell, in what he terms "the decision-making" perspective.¹⁸ Using this approach, "where you stand depends on where you sit," and the winner (in terms of internal success) is the one who "stands tallest," or causes his view to prevail. As Lovell points out, this approach is indebted to, and interwoven with, concepts of organizational theory, political decision-making theory, and systems theory.¹⁹ Does it offer any help with our problem?

Yes and no. A study that could pinpoint the individual or group most powerful in the determination of the People's Republic of China foreign policy would certainly be helpful. Assuming that such an individual, or group of individuals, could be thus isolated, further studies of their power functions, and even of their psychological make-up, if accurate, would offer an explanation for their past actions and a basis to predict their future ones.²⁰ Narrowing this focus to the area of Latin America would explain specific actions, and forecast future ones. Several particular difficulties make this approach fraught with peril. The closed nature of most communist

¹⁸ Lovell, Foreign Policy in Perspective, p. 58.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 59.

²⁰ See, for instance, Joseph H. De Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus: Charles F. Merrill, 1968), for an application of psychological theory to decisions and decision-making.

societies, which would seem even more true in the case of China, precludes an easy task of identification of players in the game, and of the power they wield. Also, the channels by which that power is gained and exercised do not permit easy scrutiny. It is relatively simple to postulate hypotheses about Henry Kissinger as a policy advisor to the President. But who is Chou En Lai's Henry Kissinger? Is there one? Was it the same one last month? What is Chou's relationship to Mao? These are questions on which even the most erudite of Sinologists disagree. Even if the holders of power can be identified, would the application of westernized psychological technique be that revealing of the Chinese mind?²¹

A strictly psychological/decision-making model might lead us even further from reality. Its success depends on the availability of data, whether memoirs, government documents, or minutes of press conferences. These things are not available, or if available, are so scant and so subject to built-in bias that they require labyrinthian logic and certainly more knowledge than most students possess to decipher. However, despite the criticism of Model III, it should be stated that it is the resources that make the model work that are lacking and not a weakness of the model itself.

²¹ An affirmative answer might seem appropriate, at least in view of some rather accurate psychological studies of the Japanese leadership in World War II.

ANOTHER CONCEPTUAL MODEL

When considering all the foregoing, of all the approaches examined, the one that seems to allow the most flexibility and utility is that of Model I (The Rational Policy Model). Using Model I, it is possible to construct a view of People's Republic of China's relationships with Latin America along the lines illustrated in Figure 1.

Inputs shown are geopolitical, ideological, psychological and goal values. Geopolitical factors would include relevant aspects of the environmental structure. Important aspects would include:


- (1) spatial relationships
- (2) pattern of supply and demand on human and material resources
- (3) authority pattern
- (4) rules of the game²²

A quick examination would indicate that most of these factors would tend to inhibit the People's Republic of China activity in Latin America. Great distances, lack of any traditional contact or trade, and United States hegemony all work to inhibit Chinese penetration.

Ideology is another matter. As Cecil Johnson states:

. . . The Chinese are convinced that the main 'contradiction' in the contemporary world is that between the 'oppressed' peoples of the Third World on the one hand, and the 'imperialists,' led by the United States, on the other . . .

²² Lovell, Foreign Policy in Perspective, pp. 141 and ff.



A MODEL OF PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA--
LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONSHIPS

Figure 1

In fact, they contend that the entire course of history will, for the most part, be determined by the outcome of the fighting in the continents constituting the so-called Third World.²³

The call for world-wide revolution, implicit in most Chinese statements in the foreign affairs field, is a dynamic with great import, especially in areas susceptible to its attainment.

Psychological factors also might prove important, especially if there is some unique quality about the Chinese "world view" not present in activities of other nations.

National goals may or may not overlap any of the foregoing and are closely related to psychological factors. However, in an analysis of Chinese foreign policy, it is probably useful to distinguish between national goals -- goals which relate to Chinese conceptions of history -- and definite peculiarities of communist goals.²⁴

The factors above react upon and in the People's Republic of China "foreign relations machine." For this analysis, the machine includes, but is not limited to, such structures as the Chinese Communist Central Committee, the State Council, its Foreign Experts Bureau, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The resulting broad policy outputs from this array are further translated into action performed by a plethora of personalities and agencies. Examples

²³ Cecil Johnson, Communist China and Latin America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 1.

²⁴ See Frank N. Trager and William Henderson, eds., Communist China 1949-1969 -- A Twenty Year Appraisal (New York: New York University Press, 1970), pp. 208-309.

of action mechanisms would be the official representative abroad, the propaganda and news staffs, such as New China News Agency, and other party and trade representatives, both in China and overseas.

How do these agencies act to fulfill their missions? Three broad areas are discernible. They act on the state to state, party to party, and people to people levels. These functional areas are crucial to any analysis of Chinese policy toward Latin America. Although not mutually exclusive, each is marked by certain distinct qualities.

State to state relations are best viewed in the light of normal diplomatic relations in which representatives of foreign state perform functions of representation, observation, and protection of national interest.²⁵ These functions may coincide or conflict with other functions performed by the other two portions of the triad.

"Party to Party" relations are those conducted between the Communist Party of China and other Marxist/Leninist parties, or factions of those parties, in other sovereign states. Diplomatic representation does not preclude, and in fact may facilitate such activity, even though its purpose is often contradictory to that of the "regular" diplomatic establishment.

²⁵

H. B. Jacobini, *International Law: A Text* (Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 1968), pp. 208-210.

"People to "People" relations are those activities conducted to win friends for the People's Republic of China. Those friends may be in or out of the government of the host state, Marxist or non-Marxist, influential or uninfluential. Activities here would be termed "cultural relations," with the immediate goal being a favorable public predisposition toward either diffuse or specific People's Republic of China policy objectives. It might encompass items such as a visit by a Chinese ballet troupe (diffuse objective) or a statement of support for fishermen in the controversy over off-shore sovereignty (a specific objective).

The interfaces for interaction in such a model would be at the nation-state level for formal international representation, with each action viewed as monolithic. At the party to party level, interactions would take place within and without the nation-state, as Latin followers of the Chinese Marxist vision would respond both to internal and external guidance and direction. The people to people, or cultural, level would have interaction both at the state as a monolith and individual level, depending on such things as recipient government receptivity to cultural exchange, and interest in that exchange by citizens within the country.

SUMMARY

To return to the original question, the examination of China's role in Latin America, would this model be practical for application?

Would an examination of these three functions really reveal Chinese policy, goals and aspirations? It would appear that its chances of success are rather high. Such a model focuses interest on those areas most accessible to study, and those that lend themselves most readily to analysis. Sources for such an analysis are available, both from the People's Republic and from the nations in Latin America. The model appears flexible and broad enough to include some examination of most views of international relations.

The model also facilitates the generation of several hypotheses.

Those selected for more detailed examination include:

- (1) If the People's Republic of China-Latin American state to state relationships increase, then the People's Republic of China party to party relationships will decrease.
- (2) Obversely, if the People's Republic of China-Latin American state to state relationships decrease or deteriorate, then the People's Republic of China party to party relationships will increase.
- (3) If state to state relations increase, then there will be an increase in people to people programs.
- (4) Obversely, if party to party relationships increase, then there will be a decrease in people to people programs.

Each of these hypotheses is worthy of more detailed examination and explanation, which will be undertaken in subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER II

CHINESE PERSPECTIVES OF LATIN AMERICA

THE IMPACT OF CHINESE HISTORY

Historically, Latin America has been of little interest to the rulers of China. Separated by great distances and diverse cultures, with little reason for intercourse, Latin America has been, until recent times, a terra incognita for Peking's leaders.

In addition to the physical barriers to international relations, important cultural barriers have existed, and still exist, to place Latin America in a peripheral place in the Chinese view of the world. If not prisoners of their long and glorious history, the Chinese are certainly influenced by it. If the T'ang dynasty (AD 618-907) was the model emulated as long as there was a Chinese empire, it would seem improbable that such long-standing perceptions of the world would exhibit no continuity after Mao's revolution.¹ The period of the T'ang dynasty, China's "Golden Age" was one in which there was considerable contact with West Asian and Byzantine cultures, contacts which reinforced and perpetuated a Chinese ethnocentrism which continues to this day.

¹C. P. Fitzgerald, The Chinese View of their Place in the World (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 24.

Western historians would be hard put to describe the later Middle Ages as the flower of Western culture. This was the period in which more contacts with the West were made, exceeding those of later years until the most recent times.² In contrast to the accomplishments of the Chinese of that period, Western civilization was a pale competitor, little worth knowing and certainly not worthy of adoption. Traditional China of the Middle Kingdom was pre-eminent in culture and powers within its own limited sphere.³

That pre-eminence enabled her to construct a system of tributary states around her in Asia, admittedly a loose system, but one in which status was determined by the degree of acceptance of Chinese culture, manners and mores.

An effective and comprehensive political system, a common written language, and an elaborate code of social and ethical conduct embodied in Confucianism completely justified the Chinese view of their own superiority.⁴

²C. P. Fitzgerald, The Chinese View of their Place in the World, pp. 21-22.

³Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, p. 4.

⁴Ibid., p. 4.

Those people and nations unfortunate enough not to be Chinese were thus cast in the mold of barbarians or at best semi-civilized peoples, not to be admired, but to be pitted against one another to China's advantage.

The traditional Chinese view of international politics is well expressed in the dictum "use barbarians to control barbarians."⁵ Just as thousands of years ago the Han dynasty enlisted the aid of the Yueh-Chih against the Hsiung-nu, so the Ming used the Western Mongols against the eastern Mongols.

The parallels with modern China are readily apparent, as first one and then another set of imperialists have been played off against each other. British against Russians, Americans against Japanese, and now apparently the possibility of Americans pitted against the Russians have all served to further the purposes of the Chinese nation.

The Chinese superiority complex has been the main link between traditional Chinese views of the world and more recent Communist Chinese foreign policy. The implicit acceptance of the inferiority of all foreigners was manifest when, during the Cultural Revolution, the People's Republic of China withdrew its

⁵John King Fairbank, The United States and China (New York: The Viking Press, 1970), p. 316.

ambassadors from every post abroad except one in order that they might participate. What other nation would even consider such a step in today's world?

Communist China, as well as its traditional predecessors, is convinced that it is the repository of unique attributes that should be accepted by all nations and all people.⁶ This acceptance encompasses a willingness of even those remote from Chinese power to acknowledge Chinese political leadership. Latin America, remote and distant as it may be from China, can prove itself a worthy pupil, as may any other nation.

As Albert Feuerwerker emphasizes, however, the persistence of tradition in Chinese foreign policy is not simple and unproblematic.⁷ Other factors also operate to shape China's world view. China today is not the China of the Golden Age, nor is it the China of the decaying Ching dynasty (1644-1911). Even so, the Chinese superiority complex is a factor in evaluating China's view of Latin America, particularly in light of the slight contact and lack of similar interests between the two areas, which facilitates the maintenance of that superiority complex through lack of knowledge.

⁶Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, p. 5.

⁷Albert Feuerwerker, "Chinese History and the Foreign Relations of Contemporary China." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 402 (July, 1972) 2.

The absence of contact between China and the nations of Latin America continued until quite recent years. As the Ching dynasty declined, China was subjected to humiliation by numerous Western powers. Latin American nations were not active in these struggles, but their relatively limited transactions with China were just as denigrating to the Chinese self-image as were the actions of larger, imperialist powers.

Such contacts as did exist during the mid and late 19th century were exploitive, and limited generally to the procurement of Chinese peasants for plantation labor. Chinese coolies were imported into a number of Southern Hemisphere countries, for example Brazil and Peru.⁸

In Peru, between 90,000 and 150,000 Chinese were imported as plantation laborers in the period 1849-1874.⁹ Limited immigration to Brazil began in 1810.¹⁰ Problems of assimilation, fears

⁸Jose Honoris Rodrigues, "Brazil and China, The Varying Fortunes of Independent Diplomacy," in Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents, A. M. Halpern, ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 457-458.

⁹Mario C. Vazquez, "Immigration and Mestizoje in Nineteenth Century Peru," Magnus Mornier, ed., Race and Class in Latin America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 82-83. See also Watt Stewart, Chinese Bondage in Peru (Durham: Duke University Press, 1951).

¹⁰Rollie E. Poppino, Brazil: The Land and the People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 184.

of "The Yellow Peril," and Chinese Imperial displeasure at mistreatment of the immigrants served to limit further immigration, and commercial and cultural ties were weak. Thus, until very recent times, a weak China and Latin America had little in common, no desire to increase ties, and little capability to do so.

MAO AND POST-WAR CHANGE

The rise of the Communists to power in China altered the outlook of Chinese policy makers toward Latin America in several important aspects. Most important among these new factors were: (1) Marxist Leninist ideology as interpreted by Mao; (2) Resurgent nationalism; and (3) International Communist politics.¹¹ These factors have awakened a new and abiding interest on the part of the People's Republic of China in Latin America.

Mao Tse-Tung's thought, as the "highest form of Marxist-Leninism," is presented by the Chinese as the ideological model for revolutionary activity in all the under-developed world. Mao's thoughts are to serve as the inspiration to revolutionaries of all colors and countries in their fight against United States "imperialism" and Soviet "revisionism."

¹¹ Cf. Feuerwerker, 5-6.

The Chinese pride themselves on their capability to "scientifically" analyze the world in terms of the Marxist dialectic, the scientific observation of phenomena in all spheres, validated by the practice of the Party and the proletariat. Mao stated that "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movements," but he also emphasized that revolutionary theory must have practical application to conform to objective reality.¹² Application of the theory to concrete problems determines its validity through the achievements or non-achievements of the objectives set out for it. If it does not, then the theory is changed until it achieves its desired objectives. Mao's pragmatic approach is readily apparent in his essay, "On Practice" and in his other writings, where the pre-eminent role of theory is to effect change in the world, not explain the world. Mao's pragmatic approach is also apparent in his "On Contradiction," in which idealists are berated for their analysis of the causes of change.¹³

Although the Chinese Communist Party lays claim to analyzing all problems in the world on the basis of the dialectic,

¹² Mao Tse-Tung, "On Practice," Selected Works of Mao tse-Tung, I (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 304.

¹³ Mao Tse-Tung, "On Contradiction," Selected Works of Mao tse-Tung, I (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 312.

more neutral observers have disagreed as to what extent national interests have been expressed in terms of that dialectic.¹⁴ Ideological expression of more selfish aims is certainly not an uncommon event in the history of all nations, but to assume that the dialectic serves only as a convenient device by which the Chinese leadership can engage in a retroactive rationalization of their decisions is to overstate the case. Ideology does color Chinese Communist actions, if in no other way than to provide a "mind-set" through which world perceptions are filtered. Contrary to Feuerwerker, it would seem that Mao and his leaders do take their ideology seriously, and that ideology serves a purpose more comprehensive than as "a product of the short-range tactical needs of the Chinese nation-state."¹⁵

PRINCIPAL VERSUS FUNDAMENTAL CONTRADICTION

In Mao's view, which is a reiteration of the work of earlier Marxists, the basis for change lies within the thing itself, and is not caused by some external force. Contradiction within things results in the ultimate development of all things.¹⁶

¹⁴For instance, see Feuerwerker, pp. 9-11, and Cecil Johnson, Communist China and Latin America, 1959-1967, p. 31, for opposing interpretations of the role of ideology.

¹⁵Feuerwerker, p. 10.

¹⁶Mao tse-Tung, "On Contradiction," p. 312.

In speaking of the universality of contradiction, Mao delineates a two-fold meaning: (1) Contradictions exist in the development of all things, and (2) Within the developmental process there is a movement of opposites throughout all stages of that process. Thus, there is a commonality or universality among all forms of motion in matter or things.

Mao places even more emphasis on the second point, the movement of opposites. As he states in "On Contradiction":

But what is equally important and necessary, constituting as it does the foundation of our knowledge of a thing, is to observe what is particular to this form of motion, namely, to observe the qualitative differences between this form of motion and other forms. Only when we have done this can we distinguish between things. Every form of motion contains within itself its own particular contradiction It is the internal cause, or as it may be called, the basis for the immense variety of things in the world.¹⁷

In practical terms, the theory of contradiction enables the Marxist-Leninist leader to analyze any given political situation, and to determine the major contradictions within that situation. Not only can major contradictions be distinguished at a point in time, their relative importance can also be determined. Thus, at least in theory, the leader, by using dialectic materialism, can determine who his principal opponents are; who will support him or his cause against these opponents; the

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 319-320.

opponent's strengths and weaknesses; and the strategy and tactics that will bring victory over the opponent.¹⁸

Equally essential is the determination of the principal contradiction, for it determines the most crucial question facing the leadership. As Mao also stated:

There are many contradictions in the process of development of a complex thing, and one of them is necessarily the principal contradiction whose existence and development determine or influence the existence and development of the other contradictions

Hence, if in any process there are a number of contradictions, one of them must be the principal contradiction playing the leading and decisive role, while the rest occupy a secondary and subordinate position. Therefore, in studying any complex process in which there are two or more contradictions, we must devote every effort to finding the principal contradiction. Once this principal contradiction is grasped, all problems can be readily solved.¹⁹

As an example of the principal contradiction, Mao cites the war against the Japanese (1937-46) in which the contradiction between the Japanese imperialists and the Chinese people was more important than the class contradiction dividing China. As it was the principal contradiction, it became the focus of Chinese activity and interest.

¹⁸Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 25.

¹⁹Mao Tse-Tung, "On Contradiction," I, Selected Works of Mao tse-Tung, 331-332.

In the years immediately prior to 1965, the official Chinese analyses of the world situation avoided enunciating a principal contradiction, instead, four major "fundamental contradictions" were set forth. These were: (1) The contradiction between the socialist and imperialist camps; (2) The contradiction between imperialism and the oppressed countries; (3) The contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries; and (4) The contradiction among the imperialist nations themselves.²⁰

In this analysis, the Chinese focused particular attention on certain areas of the world. This focus is shown in the following passage:

The various types of contradictions in the contemporary world are concentrated in the vast area of Asia, Africa and Latin America; these are the most vulnerable areas under imperialist rule and the storm centers of world revolution dealing direct blows at imperialism . . .

The anti-imperialist revolutionary struggles of the people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are pounding and undermining the foundations of the rule of imperialism and colonialism, old and new . . .

In a sense, therefore, the whole cause of the international proletarian revolution hinges on the outcome of the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of these areas.²¹

²⁰A statement of this position is given in the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Letter of June 14, 1963 to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, The Polemic of the General Line of the International Communist Movement (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp. 6-7.

²¹Ibid., p. 13.

In the Chinese view, these areas, with two-thirds of the world's population, and with their resources and markets providing the underpinning to the economic well-being of the capitalist nations, had been hurled into the modern world by the stresses generated by World War II, and by the rising tide of economic and nationalistic aspirations. The resulting economic and political conflicts provided a great potential for revolution. The nations of the Third World were therefore the "strategic rear area" of the imperialists, while at the same time the most susceptible to being enlisted in the fight against imperialism.

PEOPLES' WAR

The policy of four major fundamental contradictions underwent sweeping change in 1965. In May of that year P'eng Chen, mayor of Peking, declared in a major policy speech in Indonesia that contradiction between the "oppressed nations" of Asia, Africa and Latin America, on one side, and "imperialism" headed by the United States, on the other, had become the principal contradiction. This signaled a change in policy of major importance. Hitherto, no "principal contradiction" had been cited, and the responsibility for bringing world revolution had rested primarily on the proletariat of the Western industrialized nations. Now, the battle against "imperialism," especially United States imperialism, was the most important task facing communists everywhere.

P'eng's speech was the forerunner of a more detailed exposition made in September 1965, by then - Defense Minister Lin Piao. In his famous article "Long Live the Victory of People's War," Lin repeated P'eng Chen's restatement of the principal contradiction, and elaborated on some of the theoretical implications. In his words:

Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called "the cities of the world," then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute "the rural areas of the world." Since World War II, the proletarian revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America has been growing vigorously. In a sense, the contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of the encirclement of the cities by rural areas. In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African, and Latin American peoples who make up the overwhelming majority of the world's population.²²

This shift from the "four fundamental contradictions" to the "principal contradiction" placed the full burden for the success of the current stage of the world communist revolution on the struggle of the people of Latin America, as well as Asia and Africa, with that struggle to be conducted against the imperialists, most conspicuously the United States.

The announcement of this radical position received immediate and apprehensive attention in Western countries.

²² Peking Review, no. 36, September 3, 1965, p. 24.

It also contained less obvious implications for China's ideological dispute with the Soviet Union. The new formulation was a sharp break with Soviet policy, and could serve as an equally keen weapon against either Western imperialism or Soviet revisionism.²³ The implicit similarities with the domestic policies pursued by the Chinese Communist Party during their rise was another important aspect of the new policy.²⁴

Although China's implementation of this radical new line was to be much more pragmatic than dogmatic, it seemed at that time to forecast an involvement in Wars of National Liberation by the Chinese on an unprecedented scale. Western, and especially United States, policy makers cast many of their actions as a response to these Wars of National Liberation, the most notable case in point being Vietnam. Che Guereva's very unfortunate (for him) experience in Bolivia could also be said to represent a faulty interpretation of the new doctrine.

As John F. Melby states:

The weakness of this reaction to the doctrine of People's War was the failure, or even the deliberate attempt to give proper weight to the elaboration of the

²³ Van Ness, p. 29.

²⁴ Such a similarity had been previously noted by some observers. See Robert A. Scalapino's analysis in Joseph E. Blank and Kenneth Thompson, eds., Foreign Policies in a World of Change (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 549-588.

declaration of support. This not-so-fine point stated that imperialism in the end would be destroyed and oppressed peoples would be delivered. But it then went on to add that these Wars of National Liberation occur only when the internal conditions were right; the peoples most directly involved must start them; they must bear the major brunt of the struggle. In brief, revolution was not an exportable commodity, although naturally China would give assistance, once it did occur.²⁵

Although Professor Melby's point is well taken, it profits from the enormous benefit of hindsight. Perhaps if Peoples' War had proven more successful, less would be said about the fine print involved.

If the imperialists, lead by the United States, were the enemy, and the Third World the battleground, then armed struggle was the means by which the imperialists would be overthrown.

In Latin America, as well as Africa and Asia, the problem of state power is upper-most. In the then-current Chinese view, those who hold power do not relinquish it peacefully, their overthrow is required by revolutionary war. Although peaceful co-existence may be possible between states, there can be no peaceful co-existence between the oppressed and the oppressor, either in Latin America or elsewhere in the Third World.

²⁵ John F. Melby, "Maoism as a World Force," The Annals of the American Academy, 402, (July, 1972), 29-30.

Theoretically, the concentration of contradictions in Latin America had produced a situation ripe for revolution. These conditions should be seized upon and utilized to further the cause of world communism.

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

Another important dynamic shaping Chinese policies toward Latin America, one closely interwoven with ideological considerations discussed above, was the Sino-Soviet dispute. Without attempting to treat every turn of that long and complicated affair, even a cursory examination would reveal deep seated sociological, historical, and national interest differences between the two nations.²⁶ These differences, expressed vociferously in the contest between the People's Republic of China and the USSR, have helped to shape China's relations with Latin American revolutionaries as well as Latin American nation states.

The break with the Soviet Union forced Chinese policy makers to look for whatever allies they could find among the international Communist parties, giving impetus to Chinese support for the "splitism" still evident in the Latin American parties.

²⁶ Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, pp. 153-157. Hinton also notes personal antipathy between Mao and Khrushchev as a major causal factor in the dispute.

Also, the struggle to maintain their authority in international communist circles caused actions which could further Chinese, rather than communist, international goals. These supra-national needs resulted in Latin American relationships predicated on Chinese, rather than local, objectives.

In sum, the Chinese perspective of Latin America was as an area in which the chances for communist success were high, and the chances to inflict injury on both United States and USSR "imperialists" were also high. Chinese success, if obtained, would serve to satisfy both nationalist and ideological fervor.

CHAPTER III

CHINESE AND LATIN AMERICAN
PARTY TO PARTY RELATIONSHIPS

THE SETTING

During the initial years following their rise to power, China's new leaders had been content to follow the lead of the Soviets in Latin America.¹ The praise provided by various communist leaders in Latin America for the People's Republic of China in the 1959's attests to that, especially as those same leaders were to subsequently take pro-Soviet stands.²

Although low on the priority list, Latin America and Latin Communists were not completely ignored during that period. Chinese analyses of the Latin American situation during the period 1948-1958 stressed "National Liberation, National

¹Robert Alexander's Communism in Latin America (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957), indexes 20 items concerning the Soviet Union, none concerning the People's Republic of China.

²See William E. Ratliff, "China and Latin America," Asian Survey, XII, 10 (October, 1972), 851, for a discussion of possible Sino-Latin cooperation in the 1930's. Also Eudorio Ravines, The Yenan Way (New York: Greenwood Press, 1951), for a participant's views.

Revolutionary," and "National Democratic" fronts and movements. Common Chinese propaganda themes were the elimination of control over national affairs by United States "Imperialism," trade relations with the Socialist camp, and independent economic and foreign policies. These were linked with the constructive aspects of the Chinese model of revolution, and aimed at a target audience which was inclusive of all who might be tempted to take an anti-United States stance.³

In turn, Latin American Communists, regardless of whatever homage they might on occasion pay to the Chinese, had a long tradition of subordination to the Soviet Union. Their leaders took their political and ideological cues from the Soviet Union, and had been most loyal in their support.⁴

The loyalty of Latin American Communist leaders to the Soviet Party was to hamper the Chinese in later developments, even if it did not dampen their ardor.

As the first cracks in the Sino-Soviet alliance began to appear after Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin before the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956, the Chinese attempted to exploit

³Ratliff, "China and Latin America," p. 849.

⁴Johnson, Communist China and Latin America, p. 181.

the widespread confusion and bewilderment among formerly staunchly Stalinist Latin Communists. At their invitation, delegates from eleven Latin American countries visited China following the 20th Soviet Congress. These delegates (from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru) attended the 8th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, and heard Liu Shao-Ch'ei voice the opinion that anti-imperialist struggle there would encompass the whole continent.⁵

In addition to being received by Liu, an audience was also attained with Mao himself. This had a profoundly favorable effect on the delegates. The Brazilian delegate, Diogenes Arruda, chief aide of the party leader Luis Carlos Prestes, was most enthusiastic about the visit. As he later related to Oswaldo Peralva, a fellow Brazilian communist:

Like so many other delegates to the 20th Congress, it was only in China that he had heard of the existence of Khrushchev's secret speech and had been told some of its salient points . . . Arruda related to me his

⁵Shen-Yu Dai, "Sugar Coated Bullets for Latin America," *Current Scene*, 23 December 1961, p. 2.

⁶Ernst Halperin, "Peking and the Latin American Communists," *The China Quarterly* (January-March 1967), p. 119, quoting Oswaldo Peralva, *O Retrato*, Rio de Janeiro: Editora Globo, 1962.

list of grievances against the Soviet bureaucrats. He compared them unfavorably with the Chinese. Proudly he told me how he, together with the rest of the Latin American Communist delegation, had been received by Mao Tse-Tung, who had talked with them for two hours and even asked whether they wanted to continue the conversation. In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, he said, he had never had the honour of being received even by the most obscure member of the Central committee.⁶

As a former newspaper man on the staff of the Cominform, Peralva had had knowledge of Sino-Soviet disagreements well before 1956. He cited the fact that the Chinese had been requested to join the Cominform in 1949, and had failed to even reply to the invitation. According to Peralva, the major ideological disputes before 1956 centered on (a) the problem of the patterns of revolution, with Russian insistence on the model of October 1917; and (b) the problem of post-revolutionary development, in which the Chinese insisted that urban and rural bourgeoisie could be peacefully integrated into a socialist society.⁷ Thus, joining the Cominform would have either brought ideological clashes that the Chinese wished to avoid at that time, or required their acquiescence in the Soviet line, which they were unwilling to do.⁸

⁷Ibid., p. 120ff.

⁸Ibid., p. 117.

Partially as a result of Peralva's favorable impression of the People's Republic, a group of Brazilian party cadres was dispatched to China for a six month period of indoctrination.⁹

Luis Corvalan, the Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Chile, also visited China in 1959. Although Corvalan later claimed that he had, even then, detected signs of Sino-Soviet discord, on his return he was extremely laudatory of Mao and his entourage, and mouthed Chinese slogans such as "The east wind prevails over the west wind," and "Imperialism is a paper tiger." Corvalan also cooperated in sending Chilean Communists, billed as "Spanish language teachers and specialists" to China at the request of the Chinese Communist Party, a practice that continued until 1963.¹⁰

During this initial period, the Chinese appeared reluctant to call for revolution on the Chinese model in Latin America. In those areas where armed uprisings did materialize, the Chinese praised the rebels, but did not predict their success or the spread of such revolts to other Latin countries.¹¹ Such an attitude was well in keeping with realities in Latin America. Only one regime

⁹ Ibid., p. 120.

¹⁰ Ernst Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965), pp. 104-105.

¹¹ Ratliff, "China and Latin America," pp. 848-849.

rose there as a result of an armed uprising, that of Pas Estenssoro in Bolivia in 1952. Although the Chinese were enthusiastic about "progressive" policies there and in the short-lived ascendancy of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala, it did not seem likely that these limited successes would sweep Latin America.

Several factors were to change the Chinese position toward the end of the 1950's. The overthrow of numerous Latin American dictatorships was noted by the Chinese.¹² The Chinese also noted the widespread holocaust that greeted Vice-President Nixon's South American visit in 1958.

This increase in "revolutionary consciousness," coupled with a general hardening of the Chinese foreign policy line, improved the outlook for armed struggle in Latin America.

Premier Chou En-Lai, in an August 1958 interview with two Brazilian correspondents, stated that "the Latin American peoples are standing in the forefront of struggle against United States imperialism."¹³ An August 1958 article in a Chinese foreign affairs publication pointed out that "armed struggle is still not the primary

¹² Juan Peron (Argentina) fell in 1955, Rojas Pinilla (Columbia) in 1957, Perez Jimenez (Venezuela) in 1958, and Fulgenio Batista's Cuban regime was in serious trouble at this time.

¹³ Peking Review, no. 26, August 26, 1958, p. 2.

form of struggle" in Latin America, but added that its importance could increase in countries with "Pro-American reactionary regimes" and in countries which "American imperialism is directly engaged in military intervention or plotting a reactionary coup." In those countries, "Armed struggle may become the leading form of struggle."¹⁴

The Chinese hailed Fidel Castro's assumption of power in Cuba in January 1959, but did not immediately advocate a policy of armed struggle in all Latin American countries. At this time the Chinese felt the armed struggle tactic was generally suitable only against entrenched dictatorships, such as those of Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and the Dominican Republic. The united front and unarmed struggle remained the principal tactic elsewhere in Latin America.¹⁵

An example of the Chinese line toward the broad united front was given in the greetings of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. This document lauded the Brazilian Party for its efforts to develop "a national and democratic united front," and claimed that "owing to the ever-increasing strength of the socialist

¹⁴Yen Chin, "The Characteristics of the Present Latin American National Liberation Movement," Shih-chieh Chih-shih, no. 16, 20 August 1958, p. 18.

¹⁵Ratliff, "China and Latin America," p. 849.

camp and the vigorous development of the national and democratic movements in the African, Asian, and Latin American countries, U.S. imperialism has become isolated."¹⁶

In the next few years, Chinese advocacy of the "national and democratic," and "national democratic" (broad united front) tactic was to diminish, although not disappear. As for the increasing number of countries where "armed struggle" was acceptable to the Chinese, the form suggested was that of the Cuban model. On the occasion of Che Guervara's official visit to Peking in November 1960, Chou En-Lai praised the Cuban armed struggle and stated that "The Cuban people have become the hope and example of the other Latin American peoples."¹⁷

Chinese Vice-Premier Li Hsien-Nieu stated that:

✓The People's Republic of China✓ considers that the Cuban People's struggle and victory have provided abundant experience and set an example for all oppressed peoples in the world, particularly the Latin American peoples, in their struggle to win and safeguard national independence.¹⁸

This mutual cordiality was not to last for long. Soviet material support for the Castro regime began soon after Anastas Mikoyan's

¹⁶Peking Review, No. 37, September 14, 1960, p. 4.

¹⁷Peking Review, No. 47, November 22, 1960, p. 5.

¹⁸Peking Review, No. 49-50, December 13, 1960, p. 41.

visit in February 1960, when a commercial treaty with the Soviets was negotiated. By July 1960, Castro was calling on all the peoples of Latin America to follow the Cuban example and rise against the imperialists. Earlier that year, Che Guervara had published the ideological text for the Fidelistas, Guerrilla Warfare. Guervara set forth three basic theses:

- (1) The people in arms can win a war against the regular army.
- (2) It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for revolution exist; the insurrectionary nucleus can create them.
- (3) In the underdeveloped areas of the Americas the countryside must be the basic terrain for the armed struggle.¹⁹

As Ernst Halperin notes, on cursory review it would seem that Chinese and Cuban positions coincided. However, a closer examination would reveal gaping differences between Castro and both Soviet and Chinese interpretations of Marxist-Leninism concerning the second thesis. The essential role of the party, "the vanguard of the proletariat and the leader of the revolutionary struggle," is missing from Guervara's formulation.²⁰

Castro was eager, for many reasons, to gain full-fledged recognition as a "Socialist" nation, but both the Chinese and the

¹⁹Translated from Ernesto Guervara, La Guerra de Guerrillas, Havana, Ediciones Minifair, 1960, p. 11, and quoted in Halperin, Peking and the Latin American Communists, p. 123.

²⁰Ibid., p. 123.

Soviets were most reluctant to grant that privileged status to him. It was not until April 18, 1962 that the Chinese recognized the "Socialist" nature of the Cuban Revolution.²¹ By that time the Cuban missile crisis had weakened the beneficial effects of that recognition.

The humiliation suffered by the Soviet Union as a result of their Cuban adventure weakened the overall revolutionary potential of the area, but did present several favorable aspects to Peking.

The crisis in Cuban-Soviet relations strengthened Peking's weak hand with Castro. Castro's disgust at his treatment by the Soviets resulted in Cuban refusal to join in the condemnation of China's tiny ally Albania, meted out at the East German Party Congress of January 1963.

At the same time, this widespread disillusionment served to increase tension within the regular Communist parties, whose leaders were attempting to maintain a moderate course following the Soviet failure. The Chinese, prompted by their growing feud with the Soviets and eager to exploit any advantage, soon stepped up their activities in Latin America. The first Spanish

²¹Editorial in Jen-Min Jih-pao, April 18, 1962, in Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP), No. 2725, April 26, 1962. Halperin gives the date as September 17, 1962, citing Peking Review, No. 39, September 28, 1962. The earlier date appears correct.

language version of Peking Review, Pekin Informa, was published on March 6, 1963. This forced a reluctant reaction from Communist Party chieftains throughout the continent. Where previously they could publicly ignore the growing Sino-Soviet rift, even if discussing it at the higher party levels, they were now required to condemn either the Chinese or the Soviets. The presence of Pekin Informa on newstands throughout Latin America insured that knowledge of the Chinese world view would be readily available, and present a pro-Chinese viewpoint to the many leftists of all stripes.²² No longer could Communist parties keep from criticizing the Chinese if they were to maintain their fraternal relations with the Soviets.

THE CHINESE LETTER AND ITS EFFECTS

The famous letter of 15 June 1963, in which the Chinese spelled out in great detail their criticisms of the Soviet leadership considerably deepened the rift between them.²³ This scathing attack on both Soviet domestic policy and the hegemony of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union over Communist parties in other nations had particular significance for those parties in the

²² Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile, pp. 94ff.

²³ "Proposition Regarding the General Line of the International Communist Movement," Peking Review, No. 25, June 21, 1963, pp. 6-22.

Third World. The twenty-five points of the declaration were savage in their denunciation of the Soviet "erroneous opportunities line" and the Soviet "departure from Marxist-Leninism and proletarian internationalism."²⁴

The letter termed attitudes toward the revolutionary struggle in Latin America, as well as Asia and Africa, "an important criterion" in distinguishing those who supported world revolution from those who did not. To deny the significance of this struggle was to seek to maintain the rule of the "superior nations" over the "oppressed nations." Point 12 of the letter was a forthright call for the overthrow of pro-Soviet party leaders in those parties not in power there and elsewhere in the world.

If the leading group in any party adopts a non-revolutionary line and convert it into a reformist party, then Marxist-Leninists inside and outside the party will replace them and lead the people in making revolution.²⁵

As William E. Griffith states, this was an unprecedented appeal to replace Communist Party leadership with non-party Marxist-Leninists:

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 8-9.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 12.

The Chinese June 14 letter was thus a pragmatic ideological manifesto that could well serve, if needed, as the basis for an open and total Sino-Soviet split. Its essence was a declaration by the Chinese Communist Party that it no longer recognized the ideological primacy of the Soviet Party, since its leadership had committed treason to Marxism-Leninism, and that therefore the Chinese Party must and would now assume the leadership of "Revolutionary Marxism-Leninism." . . . to carry through the world-wide revolutionary struggle to final victory.²⁶

Reaction to this attack on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union by leaders of most Latin American Communist Parties was rapid and vociferous. The Chilean Politburo issued a statement on July 20, 1963, in which it criticized the Chinese line. According to the Chileans, the Chinese statement regarding takeover of "non-revolutionary parties" by "Marxist-Leninists who may exist inside or outside the party" was a veritable call for the division of all those communist parties that did not share the Chinese deviation. Furthermore, the Chinese distaste of peaceful co-existence was in "flagrant contradiction to the letter and the spirit of the pragmatic documents and the principles of the international communist movement."²⁷

²⁶William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge: The M. I. T. Press, 1964), p. 145.

²⁷Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile, pp. 105-106.

The radical Chilean left, both within and without the party, moved to carry the struggle a step further. Two meetings, to be held in celebration of the fourteenth anniversary of the Chinese revolution, were scheduled for September 29, 1963. One of these was sponsored by the Vanguardia Revolutionaries Marxists, an important ultra-left group. The other was sponsored mainly by members of the Frente de Aucion Popular (FRAP), but significantly included several Communist Party intellectuals. The Communist Party, as a counter-move, scheduled its own mass meeting for the same day.²⁸ The Communist Party gathering, attended by approximately 1500 members, heard the first violent attack delivered on the Chinese by the Chilean Party.

In his speech, Pablo Neruda, a member of the Chilean Politburo (and also Latin America's foremost poet) stated that:

It seems to me that the Chinese error and their violent internal and foreign policy stem from one sole fount: The cult of personality, internally and externally. We who have visited China have seen the case of Stalin repeated. Every street, every door, has a portrait of Mao Tse-Tung. Mao Tse-Tung has become a living Buddha, separated from the people by a priestly court that interprets in its own manner Marxism and the story of our times. . . Comrades, every railroad, every bridge, every factory, every airplane, every modern road, every

²⁸Ibid., pp. 107-109.

agricultural cooperative in China was built by Soviet engineers and technicians. When I was there and spent some days at a resort on the Yellow Sea, two thousand Soviet technicians generously lent by the socialist state were resting in one single hotel.

And this state is accused by the Chinese leaders of not assisting the growing forces of socialism. Those who owe everything are accusing those who gave everything.²⁹

From this point on, regular attacks on the Chinese became matter of course in the Chilean Communist press, although toned down to some extent the next year in an effort to gain some measure of unity in support of Salvadore Allende's election campaign.

The Chilean scenario was repeated generally throughout the continent. The Chinese line, while holding great appeal for ultra leftists, seemed to spell disaster to "regular line" communists. Efforts by the Chinese to woo regular communists were vigorously repulsed, preventing the called-for takeover from within. Where adherents were won, they were generally the younger party members, or not in the party at all.

As the Chinese viewed their failure to capture control of the leadership of the Latin American communists parties, they were presented with two choices if they were to increase their influence

²⁹ El Siglo, September 30, 1963, quoted in Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile, pp. 111-112.

in that area. They could either work through the young party rebels, or go outside of party affiliation and attempt to build a movement of ultra-leftists and proto-Castroites, (the bourgeois revolutionaries mentioned in the June 14 letter.)

By late 1963, the Chinese had made their decision. Although cooperation with the Fidelistas offered an enticing approach, the desire for world-wide communist leadership made such an approach ideologically unproductive. Also, and of more immediate importance, the Chinese perhaps doubted that they could maintain leadership in such a group, much closer ideologically and physically to Cuba than to China.³⁰

The first Chinese theoretical justification for a factionalist policy was given in a speech by Chou Yang, deputy director of the party propaganda department, on 20 October 1963.³¹ Chou's theme, "everything tends to split in two" was not published until two months later.³² Chou tied his analysis to that of the dialectic.

³⁰ See Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, especially Chapter 15, for a discussion of world-wide repercussions of the June 14 letter.

³¹ John Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 203.

³² Chou Yang, "The Fighting Task Confronting Workers in Philosophy and the Social Sciences" Yeh Min Yin Pao, December 27, 1963, republished in Peking Review, No. 1, January 3, 1964, p. 4.

"Whenever there is a revolutionary, scientific doctrine, its anti-thesis, a counter-revolutionary counter-scientific doctrine, is bound to arise in the course of the development of that doctrine."

Using this line of reasoning, Chou then stated:

Where there is revisionism, there will be Marxism-Leninism fighting against it; and where expulsion of Marxism-Leninists from the party and other measures are taken to create splits, new outstanding Marxist-Leninists and strong revolutionary parties are bound to emerge.³³

This call for "new outstanding Marxist-Leninist parties" served to split many Latin American Communist parties, and deepen splits already made in others.

THE SPLINTERING OF THE LATIN AMERICAN PARTIES

One major Latin-American party had already split along Chinese-Soviet lines well before the call for such splits by Chou Yang. In Brazil, Luis Carlos Prestes, a prominent party leader, had shifted to a pro-Khrushchev position by 1958, and in so doing had generated considerable opposition within both the Brazilian Politburo and among the rank and file. This new line caused so much dissension that by 1960 Prestes and other pro-Soviet leaders convened the 5th Party Congress for the purpose of expelling their opponents. According to the pro-Chinese faction, this Congress

³³Ibid., p. 5.

was preceded by rigged elections at the lower party levels, insuring that the Prestes group would have firm control of the Congress.³⁴

Prestes achieved his objective, and the Party Congress expelled twelve of the twenty-five man central committee, as well as several alternates.

In an attempt to facilitate the legalization of the party in Brazil, the Prestes group changed the name of the party in August 1961 to the Brazilian Communist Party. The pro-Chinese faction seized on this as evidence of a betrayal of the party, and demanded that an extraordinary Congress be called to prevent the name change. Their demands were denied by the Prestes faction, thus presenting them with the opportunity to break with the new party over the issue of legitimacy.³⁵

In February 1962, the pro-Chinese group held a rump Extraordinary National Congress in Sao Paulo, and appropriated the name of the former Communist Party of Brazil. Leaders of the

³⁴Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Brazil, "Reply to Khrushchev," A Class Operaria, August 1-15, 1963, in Peking Review, No. 37, September 13, 1963, p. 39.

³⁵Kevin Devlin, "Boring from Within," Problems of Communism, No. 2., Vol. XIII, March-April 1964, p. 29.

Chinese faction were Mauricio Grabois, Joao Amazonas, and Pedro Pomar, all previously expelled from the regular party in 1961. In addition to taking the former name of the regular party, the Grabois faction also revived the former's party newspaper, A Class Operaria, and established their own publishing house. Halperin states that this group apparently received both Chinese and Cuban funds to support these programs.³⁶

The pro-Chinese faction in Brazil had succeeded in splitting the party there before the Chinese had made up their minds on that issue. A two man delegation of the new party visited China in March 1963. Although received by Mao Tse-Tung, they were described in the Chinese press as members of the "Brazilian Communist Party," not by the name "Communist Party of Brazil" adopted by the new group.³⁷ Chinese reluctance to extend official recognition to the new group was also apparent when an article by Mauricio Grabois in A Class Operaria was reprinted by Peking Review in August 1963, without either the author or the newspaper identified as belonging to the new Communist Party of Brazil.³⁸

³⁶Halperin, Peking and the Latin American Communists, p. 140.

³⁷Peking Review, No. 14, April 5, 1963.

³⁸Peking Review, No. 35, August 30, 1963.

Formal recognition by the Chinese Communist Party of the new Communist Party of Brazil apparently occurred shortly thereafter, as Peking Review published a resolution by the "Communist Party of Brazil" in October 1963, which denounced Soviet requests for a world meeting of the international communist movement.³⁹

By the time of the appearance of the Chinese letter of June 14, 1963, the Grabois faction, doing business as "The Communist Party of Brazil," had already issued stinging indictments of both the Soviet leadership and their closer rivals, "The Brazilian Communist Party." A typical passage in the polemic war in progress was made by Jose Duarte, attacking his one-time colleagues:

They lauded the resolutions of the Congress of one party as unrevised laws applicable to the entire communist movement. In their eye, complete ly worthless is Lenin's behest that it is necessary to make a critical analysis of the experience of other parties and other countries. They say "one line is based on the theory of the 20th Congress of the CPSU." Thus they had based themselves, not on reality, but on something proclaimed by the leader of another Communist party. They had thus acted subjectively and departed from the Marxist-Leninist path.⁴⁰

³⁹According to Johnson, this recognition (through the Albania Party press) may have come as early as late August 1963. Johnson, China and Latin America, pp. 190-191.

⁴⁰Jose Duarte, "Attacking the Communist Party of China in Defense of Opportunism," A Class Operaria, August 16, 1963.

The military coup conducted against the Juan Goulert regime on 1 April 1964 was to prove a serious setback to both pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet parties within Brazil.

Up to that point, the Chinese could take some measure of satisfaction in their progress, both with the leftists rallying around "The Communist Party of Brazil" and with improving relationships with the Brazilian government. The coup halted progress in both areas, and disappointed Chinese hopes of growing influence within and without Brazilian Communist circles.

From the Chinese point of view, one of the most successful, and in fact the first split to receive official recognition, occurred in Peru. There, a "national conference" of the Peruvian Communist Party met in January 1964, and expelled from membership all of the pro-Soviet leadership, while condemning "the revisionist theories of Tito and his followers," and lauding "the correct stand of the Chinese Communist Party in the ideological controversy with the revisionists." The resolution called for the founding of a "strong anti-imperialist front uniting all forces which can be united, including the bourgeoisie." The former party leaders, Raul Acosta, Jorge Del Prado, and Juan Barrio were characterized as corrupt elements who had committed acts of betrayal and "degenerated politically and morally to an unheard-of extreme."⁴¹

⁴¹Peking Review, No. 7, February 14, 1964.

The pro-Soviet overthrow was facilitated by the fact that most of the pro-Chinese leadership had recently been released from jail, while their pro-Soviet antagonists had remained behind bars. The pro-Soviet group charged open complicity between the police and the pro-Chinese faction, and Raul Acosta Salas, Secretary-General of the pro-Soviet group, accused the Peruvian police of releasing his opponents early because they were aware of that faction's activity and desired to undermine the party.⁴²

The Chinese were quick to extend formal recognition to their friends in Peru. Although both factions lay claim to the title of the Peruvian Communist Party, the Chinese contended that the "national conference" had been convened by a majority of the Central Committee, and by representatives of thirteen of the seventeen regional committees.⁴³

Regardless of the validity of each side's claims and counter-claims, the Chinese had established pro-Peking leadership in at least one Latin American Party. However, control of "elitism" proved difficult, as the pro-Chinese Peruvians were soon to split again, apparently in response to internal power struggles.⁴⁴

⁴²Raoul Acosta Salas, "Whom Do the Chinese Leaders Support in Peru?" Pravda, May 22, 1964, Translated in Joint Publication Research Service, Translations in Communist Developments, No. 616, p. 26.

⁴³Johnson, Communist China and Latin America, p. 211.

⁴⁴This new split occurred early in 1966.

In Chile, the pro-Chinese Spartacus group had continued their schismatic efforts. Although no new pro-Chinese Communist Party was formed until 1966, the Spartacus group had begun publication of their own organ, Principios Marxista-Leninistas, in January 1964. This publication, in its first issue, reported a resolution "Salutes to the Communist Party of China, True Heir to the Revolutionary Organization Which Should Never be Abandoned." Other resolutions condemned the pro-Soviet Chilean leadership for their rejection of Marxist-Leninist principles.⁴⁵

According to Halperin, this issue of Principios Marxista-Leninista was significant in that it revealed the conditions set by the Chinese for membership in the new splinter parties appearing in Latin America. These conditions were: an unconditional acceptance of the Chinese Communist Party as the leader of the international communist movement; acceptance of the entire Chinese line, including the defense of Stalin; and an implied rejection of Guevara's "putschist adventurism and political adventurism." These conditions amounted to making the new parties puppets of Peking, something unacceptable to all but a minority of either the parties or the Jacobin left interested in revolutionary armed struggle.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Peking Review, No. 19, May 8, 1964, p. 26.

⁴⁶ Halperin, Peking and the Latin American Communists, p. 143.

Salvatore Allende's resounding defeat in the September 1964 elections gave ideological satisfaction to the pro-Chinese group in Chile, disproving as it did the "peaceful road to power" thesis of the pro-Soviet group. In May, 1966, the pro-Chinese group finally organized the Chilean Revolutionary Communist Party, utilizing the Spartacus factions of the regular party, the Communist Rebel Union, and other far-left militants.

This group was duly noted by Peking Review, although no names of the newly elected leadership were mentioned.⁴⁷

Another pro-Chinese Communist splinter party emerged in Columbia, following a series of intra-party battles. In February 1964, the Central Committee of the Young Communists had expelled Pedro Vasquez after he had been charged with organizing pro-Chinese factions within the party. Several other Central Committee members left the meeting rather than voice approval for a "peaceful co-existence" policy. Following this, pro-Chinese elements headed by Pedro Abel attempted to unseat the strongly pro-Soviet leadership. This attempt was repulsed, but it sharpened already keen differences and decimated the regular party apparatus.

⁴⁷ Peking Review, No. 32, August 5, 1966, p. 27.

The dissidents responded by organizing a "First Extraordinary Conference of the Regional Committees" in the fall of 1964. Its organ, Tribuna, in reporting that conference, also made reference to a "Columbian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist)" that was about to be formed.⁴⁸

This formation apparently took place in July of 1965, when a rump "Tenth Congress of the Communist Party of Columbia" was held. This meeting, as was the fashion with all of the splinter groups, condemned the regular party leaders as "renegades who, as leaders of a proletarian party, had bourgeois ideas." The ideological tone of this meeting was to presage Lin Piao's pronouncements on People's War by only a few weeks. Among the resolutions passed was one which stated:

The only way out for the Columbian people is to seize state power by revolutionary means, or in other words to destroy the state machinery and replace it by a people's political power to be formed on the basis of the Patriotic Front for Liberation and with the support of the armed people.⁴⁹

This thesis seemed to hold particular appeal in Columbia, as that nation had been racked by armed strife for several years.

⁴⁸Johnson, Communist China and Latin America, pp. 232-235.

⁴⁹Peking Review, No: 34, August 20, 1965.

Although the Congress issued statements that could be interpreted as opening a way to rapprochement with the Cubans, it is likely that the Chinese overlooked that issue in favor of the positive indorsement of political violence, an indorsement to which they were to give whole-hearted support very shortly.

In Ecuador, the pro-Soviet party leadership reported that "factionalists and schismatics" were actively trying to wrest control of the Communist Party of Ecuador. During 1965 and 1966 various party members, including Central Committee members and alternates, were expelled from the party for pro-Chinese activities. In 1966, the pro-Chinese factions, along with other ultra-leftists, began to refer to themselves as the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Ecuador.⁵⁰ According to Johnson, no "extraordinary convention" was called, as was the case in most of the countries where splits had occurred. The pro-Chinese rebels had little impact on the regular party apparatus there.⁵¹

In Bolivia, nine of the forty-four members of the Central Committee of the Bolivian Communist Party were expelled by the

⁵⁰Johnson, Communist China and Latin America, p. 235ff.

⁵¹The United States Informative Agency Publication, Communist Propaganda Organizations and Activities in Latin American During 1966 (Washington: 1967), does not list a separate pro-Chinese party for Ecuador in 1966.

Central Committee for pro-Chinese activity (or vice-versa, - In mid-April 1965, the pro-Chinese factors held another "Extraordinary First National Congress" that "expelled" the pro-Soviet faction). The rebels, who formed another "Communist Party of Bolivia," attempted to maintain some neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute, which probably accounts for their neglect in the Chinese press of that time.

By late 1966, this neutral stand was abandoned, and the group came out in complete support of Chinese positions. It suffered a serious blow at about the same time, when its principal leader, Federico Escobar Sapata, died. Shortly thereafter, government repression severely truncated what little strength it had, and it suffered another serious blow when Che Guervara, to whom it had extended polemic, but little substantive support, was killed by Bolivian Army forces in 1967.⁵²

The split in the Paraguayan Communist Party, which took place following the Havana Conference of 1964, was thought at first to be along pro-Chinese pro-Soviet lines, but in fact was an internal feud concerning support to be given Castroites, not Chinese ideology.

⁵² Johnson, Communist China and Latin America, pp. 224-229.

In Venezuela, despite Chinese efforts to woo the party leadership, no purely pro-Chinese faction emerged. Dissidents there were oriented more towards Cuba, and less toward Peking. This must have proved extremely embarrassing to the Chinese, as a full-fledged insurrection was in progress at the time. By 1967 the party had abandoned its attempt to seize power by force, further embittering both pro-Chinese and pro-Castroites in that country.⁵³

Pro-Chinese elements were also active in both Mexico and Argentina at this time. In Argentina, except for bringing denunciation from the staunchly pro-Soviet regular party, they were generally ineffective.

The same was true in Mexico, where despite apparent polemic and material support from the Chinese (of which more later) they were incapable of generating any substantial following.

In the Dominican Republic, which was the subject of intense Chinese interest during the Civil War of April 1965, the splitting tendency of the nominally pro-Chinese Dominican Popular Movement was carried to rather absurd lengths, as this group split two times during 1966, with both observers and members thoroughly confused as to the true state of affairs.

⁵³ Robert J. Alexander, The Communist Party of Venezuela (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1969), pp. 208-209.

TABLE I

Estimated Strength of Pro-Chinese Communist Parties
In Latin America - 1966*

COUNTRY	PARTY NAME	STRENGTH	STRENGTH OF PRO-SOVIET PARTY	REMARKS
Bolivia	Communist Party of Bolivia	500-1000	5000	
Brazil	Communist Party of Brazil	2 000	20, 000	
Columbia	Communist Party of Columbia - Marxist-Leninist	2 000	7-8000	
Dominican Republic	Dominican Republic Movement	405-475*	185	*Includes Dominican Republic Communist Party (90) and Orthodox Communist Party (70); DRM split 3 ways
Mexico	Bolshevik Communist Party of Mexico	150-200	38, 000*	*3000 - Mexican Communist Party - 35, 000 Socialist Peoples Party
Peru	Peruvian Communist Party	3-3500	2-2500	

*In addition, there were open splits of varying importance in the Communist Parties of Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Haiti, Uruguay and Venezuela.

SOURCE: United States Information Agency, Communist Propaganda Organizations and Activities in Latin America During 1966 (Washington: N. P.), May 10, 1967.

The Chinese, probably as confused as anyone about these events, solved their problem by shifting propaganda support to the June 14th Revolution Movement, which was really more pro-Castro than pro-Chinese, but which at least possessed some capability for united action.

All in all, the Chinese had reaped a rather small harvest from their call of June 1963. Admittedly, pro-Chinese parties and factions had formed in many countries, but they were generally weak. As the following table shows, only in Peru had the Chinese succeeded in becoming the majority voice for the Communist movement.

REASONS FOR CHINA'S FAILURE TO CAPTURE LATIN AMERICAN PARTIES

Although many different factors played a role in the failure of the Chinese to capture orthodox Communist parties in Latin America, a basic reason was that the Latin American parties had institutionalized away their revolutionary zeal.

Operating along "orthodox" Marxist-Leninist lines, the majority of Latin American parties had attempted to build the conditions necessary for a classical "proletariat" centered revolution. In attempting to bring this about, work was concentrated upon the urban trade union movement. Although

impressive "paper" gains were made in infiltrating Communists into the labor union bureaucracies, the labor union movement itself possessed little vitality, and was badly fragmented.

The relatively privileged position of the urban working class, as compared with the rural proletariat, has generally served to lessen the appeal of Marxist-Leninist ideology to this target audience.

Social and labor legislation, although spotty and ill-enforced, certainly provided better coverage to the urban worker than to the rural peasant, thus reinforcing their distaste for revolutionary communist ideology.

The reliance of the Communists on the labor unions, in addition to failing to attract any substantial mass base, also imposed serious restrictions on party leaders in their relationships with the various national governments. If they were to be able to maintain any leadership in the labor movement, which they deemed essential to make further gains, some accommodation was essential with these governments.

As Halperin notes, the quest for accommodation, particularly vis a vis dictatorial regimes, resulted in communist parties providing tacit support or neutrality, receiving in turn the right of continued existence, along with such limited ancillary

privileges as the publication of various Marxist journals and the aforementioned participation in the trade union movement.⁵⁴

Although they might, and did, engage in strenuous polemics, their continued existence required that they not go beyond these limits, or else face extermination by the government of the day. In addition, whatever support they received in their tenuous existence had come from the Soviet Union. Small, urban, and co-opted into playing some role, however minor, in the political life of the various Latin American countries, Communist party leaders could easily foresee the loss of both personal and party privileges if they adopted the zealous and active role urged on them by the Chinese. Only the zealots, both within and without the party, lacking an entrenched position to protect, proved susceptible to Chinese blandishments.

PEOPLE'S WAR - PEOPLE'S FAILURE?

Following Lin Piao's call for People's Wars in the "countrysides of the world," Peking endorsed a total of twelve revolutionary movements in Latin America during 1965. By the end of that year, the list had shrunk to eight.⁵⁵ In seven

⁵⁴Halperin, "Peking and the Latin American Communists," pp. 117-118.

⁵⁵In May 1965, the list included Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, The Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela. By the end of the year, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Haiti had been dropped. See Van Ness, pp. 155-156.

of the twelve, no sustained revolutionary struggle existed, although some violence and some sporadic guerrilla activity did occur.⁵⁶

Only five countries on the target list were facing sustained and significant revolutionary activity. In these five - Columbia, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela - revolutionary activity of assorted varieties posed serious threats to incumbent regimes.

The Chinese propaganda treatment of these revolutionaries was supportive of the Lin Piao thesis, and hailed the creation of various patriotic liberation fronts to carry on a strategy of armed struggle. However, the Chinese press consistently erred on the optimistic side when assessing their own influence in these revolutionary movements, while generally giving some credit to other revolutionary groups.

In the Dominican Republic, where the April 1965 attempt to overthrow the government brought U.S. intervention, the most active revolutionaries (The June 14 Movement) were pro-Cuban, not pro-Chinese, although no hint of this was given in the Chinese propaganda barrage.

⁵⁶These seven were Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay.

In Peru, the pro-Peking Peruvian Communist Party was credited with a role that it never played.⁵⁷ Although mention was made of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, which had actually initiated the struggle, the pro-Peking branch never played a significant role in that short-lived attempt, which fell apart by the fall of 1965, when its leader, Luis de la Puente Uceda, was killed.⁵⁸

The same was true of Chinese coverage of the Venezuelan conflict. There, a fictional unity was credited to the Communist Party of Venezuela, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, and the National Liberation Army. This unity in fact did not exist, despite hopeful Chinese pronouncements.⁵⁹

In any case, and for a variety of reasons, these revolutionary movements all failed. Although vocal in their support, the Chinese apparently provided nothing more, just that. Substantial material aid was not extended to the revolutionaries, regardless of Peking's

⁵⁷Evergreen, No. 2, 1966, pp. 30-31.

⁵⁸Norman Gall, "Peru's Misfired Guerrilla Campaign," The Reporter, January 26, 1967, pp. 36-38.

⁵⁹Robert J. Alexander, The Communist Party of Venezuela, pp. 70-71.

endorsement for their activities. Lin Piao's doctrine had proved as futile as the other Chinese attempts, especially in Africa, had proved before the enunciation of the People's War doctrine.

ASSESSMENT OF FAILURE

By 1968, it was apparent that the Chinese had failed in accomplishing their desired objectives in Latin America. These objectives; the capture of Latin American Communist Parties, and the formenting of revolutionary struggles in the countryside of Latin America, had not been attained for a combination of reasons.

In the internecine warfare for the control of Latin Communist parties, the Chinese had been defeated by the "established" party leadership, unwilling to risk either its hide or its ideological ties to the Soviet Union. Although the Chinese had managed to split many of these parties, it had gained control of only one, in Peru. The young and generally inexperienced radicals it did attract were, in many cases, more of liabilities than assets. Chinese attempts to manipulate their scattered followers in their search for co-equality with the Soviet Union were unsuccessful.

The other principal support of Chinese in Latin America, the doctrine of People's War, had proven even more of a failure. In those countries, where Peking did endorse revolutionary

movements, sufficient support failed to materialize. Swift and generally effective government counter-action brought disaster to Mao-style revolutionaries in many countries.

The very militancy of the Chinese stance served to focus attention of national governments on the revolutionaries and would-be revolutionaries. Also important was the anxiety, backed by cash, displayed by the United States. The United States intervention in the Dominican Republic was a clear signal to members of both left and right in other Latin countries that the United States was willing to take extraordinary steps to prevent the rise of additional Cubas on the Latin scene.⁶⁰

Significantly, the Chinese had failed to "put their money where their mouth was." Strident claims in Peking Review, and broadcasts over Radio Peking, had proved of little material benefit to struggling revolutionaries. In this connection, the worsening of Cuban-Chinese relations had served to effectively close the door on China's closest secure point for contact with the revolutionaries. The Chinese had proved either unwilling or unable to meaningfully support their friends in Latin America.

⁶⁰ Also important, but little noted, is the fact that many Latin countries were, or were rapidly becoming, urban rather than rural. The rural "ocean" in which the guerrilla "fish" were to swim had dried up.

TABLE 2
1971 Estimates of Pro-Soviet/Pro-Chinese Party Strengths*

COUNTRY	COMM. PARTY - SOVIET LINE	CHINESE LINE
Bolivia	1,500	1,100
Columbia	10,000	1,000
Dominican Republic	385 - Dom Rep Movement 470 - Comm. Party of Dom Rep 300 - MR 14 June 40 - Pop Socialist Party	145 - Comm. Party of the Dom Rep. 65 - Proletarian Voice
Ecuador	500	250
Peru	2,000	1,200

SOURCE: World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D. C., GPO, 1972.

*Countries listed are reported with numerical strengths in source. Other pro-Chinese factions and parties exist in countries not listed, but no unclassified strength data is cited.

At home, the demands of the Cultural Revolution had directed attention away from revolutionary struggles elsewhere. The struggles in Latin America were secondary, and attention to domestic affairs was essential.

As soon as the Cultural Revolution waned, the Chinese were ready for a new approach to Latin America, an approach that would relegate ideology to a secondary place in Chinese-Latin American relations.

TRADE PATTERNS

Most of Communist China's official contacts with Latin America were very limited and of an economic nature before 1959. In these early years, total trade between the two were even smaller than it was in the case of sub-Saharan Africa. China's exports to Latin American were always below \$2 million during this period. Although imports fluctuated greatly, China's importation of Latin goods did not exceed \$9 million until 1962.²

Reasons for this lack of trade activity were fairly obvious. As Cecil Johnson points out: (1) Great distances between Latin America and China meant high freight costs; (2) The Chinese did not have available for export those goods desired in Latin America, and vice versa; (3) Lack of diplomatic recognition hampered trade development; and (4) American "discouragement" of its Latin allies trading with Communist China was a major obstacle to the growth of any such trade.³

In addition to those reasons mentioned by Johnson, which are fully adequate to inhibit trade between the two, during its

²Excluding imports from Cuba. See Alexander Eckstein, *Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 236, and Daniel Tretiak, "China's Latin American Trade," *Far Eastern Review*, July 25, 1963, pp. 221-224.

³Johnson, *Communist China and Latin America*, pp. 14-15.

CHAPTER IV

CHINA'S DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

BACKGROUND

At first glance, it would seem that the People's Republic of China's diplomatic activities in Latin America throughout most of the post-war period have been negligible. After all, until 1960 no diplomatic relations had been established with any Latin nation. Not until Fidel Castro was firmly entrenched in Havana did the first Chinese Communist diplomat set foot in the Western Hemisphere.¹

However, even before the current surge in Communist China's diplomatic representation, various official and quasi-official state-to-state relationships were apparent. This chapter will detail both the earlier contacts and the recent expansion of formal state relations between China and Latin American countries, and will examine the reasons for the shift in emphasis from party-to-party relationships to the current stress on state-to-state relationships.

¹The diplomatic representatives of the Republic of China were expelled and formal diplomatic recognition established between Cuba and Communist China in November 1960.

early years, the People's Republic pursued a policy of "leaning to one side" in its economic approach. In practice, this meant that China tended to hoard its limited foreign exchange resources, and, especially in peripheral areas such as Latin America, to trade only when political as well as economic advantage was to be gained, unless pressed by very compelling reasons.⁴

However, by 1970, a Chinese announcement reported that:

A tremendous increase has taken place in recent years in the economic and trade relations between China and the countries of Latin America. The number of countries having trade relations with China has increased from five in 1952 to 17 in 1963; and trade turnover has increased many times.⁵

This statement trumpets an area-wide Chinese success that was more fiction than fact. Until recent years, most of the Chinese commercial activity has centered around a few large grain purchases from Argentina and Mexico, if trade with Cuba is excluded.⁶ Also, working from such a small trade base, any improvement in either exports or imports to Latin America would yield impressive percentage gains.

⁴Bernard Grossman, "China's International Economic Relations," Asian Survey, X, 9 (September 1970), 791.

⁵Li Min, "Development of Economic and Trade Relations Between China and Latin America," quoted in George Ginsburgs and Arthur Stalke, "Communist China's Trade Relations with Latin America," Asian Survey, X, 9 (September 1970), 803.

⁶In 1965, 90% of China's Latin American exports and 45% of her Latin imports resulted from trade with Cuba. *Ibid.*, p. 803.

Thus, the "impressive" Chinese gains were not quite as impressive as Li Min indicated. Chinese trade tended to be one-sided and of relatively minor importance to either China or Latin America. The majority of the trade that did take place was with Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, although abortive efforts were made in attempts to establish trade with Brazil.

In Argentina, early efforts to develop trade came to nought. Not until China was pressed to feed its people did any appreciable trade take place. The prospect of famine in China provided that impetus in the early 1960's. Argentine wheat exports to China started in 1960, with about \$1 million dollars worth sold. That figure leaped to approximately \$20 million in 1962, fell to \$3 million in 1963, and surged to a peak of \$92 million in 1964. Since that time, continuing purchases have been made, but not on such a high level.⁷ This trade has been very one-sided, with Argentina showing little interest in importing Chinese products. By 1971, trade between the two had fallen to a level of \$7.5 million, a slight increase over the \$2.4 million of 1970.⁸

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 806-807.

⁸U. S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1972 (Washington, D. C., n. p. 1973), Table 12. (Hereafter cited as Aid and Trade in 1972.)

In contrast to events elsewhere, little effort was made by the Chinese to exploit their economic dealings with Argentina in any political sense. The one way nature of the trade and a natural reluctance to inadvertently advertise their failings on the agricultural front were the most probable causes of this attitude.

In Brazil, trade efforts were initiated with the visit in 1956 of a Chinese export representative, and some sugar purchases were made in 1958. The effort thus languished until 1961, when a Brazilian economic mission visited Peking.⁹ A visit by a Chinese delegation to Brazil occurred at the same time, apparently at the behest of President Quadros.

This invitation by the head of Latin America's largest state evoked rosy visions on the part of the Chinese.¹⁰

Chinese propaganda organs made much ado about establishing new friendships on all levels with the Brazilians. Much talk produced little concrete economic activity, as trade totals in 1962-63 were approximately \$1 million.¹¹

⁹Daniel Tretiak, "China's Latin American Trade," op. cit., p. 221.

¹⁰"Brazilian Economic Delegation in China," Foreign Trade, September 1961, p. 10.

¹¹Colina MacDougald, "China's Foreign Trade," Far Eastern Economic Review, January 27, 1966, p. 617.

TABLE 3
CHINA'S EXPORTS TO AND IMPORTS
FROM LATIN AMERICA - 1970

Country	Imports	Exports In Millions of Dollars
Total	3.8	3.9
Argentina	2.5	0.9
Brazil	1.3	Negligible
Chile	0	0.5
Columbia	Negligible	0.1
Costa Rica	0	0.1
Guyana	Negligible	0.2

In addition, El Salvador and Mexico had negligible trade with the People's Republic of China during the year.

Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1971, p. 26.

Quadro's abrupt resignation, and Juan Goulart's succession did not seem to imperil Chinese economic and political objectives in Brazil. In fact, Goulart was visiting China when Quadros resigned in August 1961.¹² However, increasing dissatisfaction with Goulart's leftist activities led to the military coup of April 1, 1964, which sent Chinese hopes glimmering. The new conservative military regime moved immediately to counter Chinese activity, and trade relations were completely severed. By 1971, trade had returned to a negligible level, with Chinese imports of \$1.3 million from Brazil.

Mexico was another area where the Chinese have made strenuous efforts to develop trade, from both economic and political motivations. This effort started in 1963, when a Chinese economic and trade delegation spent two weeks in Mexico City. This touring group also visited Brazil. No firm contracts were negotiated at that time, but the groundwork was laid for further endeavors.¹³

A Chinese trade exhibition was held in Mexico in December 1963, and at its conclusion the Chinese purchased 36,000 bales of Mexican cotton. In contrast to the ill-fated Quadros-Goulart

¹²Johnson, Communist China and Latin America, op. cit., p. 17.

¹³Chi Chao-Ting, "We Visited Brazil and Mexico," Foreign Trade, September 1963, p. 3.

enthusiasm for Chinese trade, the Mexican government made initial arrangements for the trade fair through private individuals, and had remained aloof from endorsing the Chinese initiative. Subsequently, other trade did not develop to any great extent, and by 1971 China's imports from Mexico were in the neighborhood of \$4.3 million.¹⁴

For many years, Chile seemed to offer a more favorable political climate to the Chinese than most other Latin nations. Accordingly, Chinese attempts at initiating trade have had significant political overtones.

Initial official trade contacts were established in 1957, when a People's Bank of China delegation visited Chile and secured a trade agreement and negotiated contracts that sent \$2 million worth of goods to China in 1957 and 1958.¹⁵

Another Chinese trade delegation visited Santiago in 1961, with no concrete results. However, in 1964 exports of copper and iodine to China commenced.

¹⁴Aid and Trade in 1972, Table 12.

¹⁵Chang Kuang-Ton, "To Cultivate Friendship and Promote Trade," Foreign Trade, December 1964, p. 16, cited in Ginsburg and Stahnke, "China-Latin American Trade Relations," p. 809.

The Chinese continued their efforts with the Chileans, and succeeded in opening a trade office in 1965. Apparently, the Chileans proved to be tough businessmen. According to one report, the Chileans demanded and got cash payment in U.S. dollars for their efforts, which would indicate either little ideological content or extreme shrewdness in their dealings with the Chinese.¹⁶

The accession of Salvador Allende to the Chilean presidency in 1970 radically altered the trade picture. Following diplomatic recognition in December 1970, a May 1971 trade agreement called for Peking to purchase \$65-70 million of Chilean copper between 1972 and 1975, with Chile to purchase certain items, mainly food-stuffs, from China. Another 1971 agreement called for the export of 60,000 tons of nitrate to China in 1972.

Chile was the first recipient of Chinese foreign aid in the Western Hemisphere, getting a \$20 million interest free loan from the People's Republic in 1971, and another loan of between \$65 and 70 million in 1972.¹⁷

¹⁶John Gittings, "Chinese Copper," Far Eastern Economic Review, January 19, 1967, pp. 101-102.

¹⁷

Wang Chien-hsun, Changes in Relations Between Peiping and Latin American Countries (Taipei, Taiwan: 1973), Asian People's Anti-Communist League, p. 27, and Trade and Aid in 1972, Table 12. Allende's recent overthrow has effectively quashed Chinese trade, as well as its other activities in Chile.

Another late bloomer in the field of trade with the People's Republic has been Peru. Little, if any, trade took place between the two prior to the coup of October 1968, which established a military dictatorship and soon committed itself to an "anti-imperialist" stand. An agreement on trade was reached in April, 1971. Initial trade was mainly in copper and other Peruvian mineral products.

Peru became the second hemispheric recipient of Chinese aid in 1971, when the Chinese extended a \$42 million interest free loan. Further trade expansion in minerals was underway in 1972.¹⁸

Other aid activity by the Chinese in 1972 included a \$26 million loan to Guyana, as well as a few technical personnel to Chile.¹⁹ Overall, Chinese trade activity could be characterized as active, but relatively unsuccessful prior to 1960, quite high in the early sixties, (Primarily due to Chinese grain shortages), low during the period of the cultural revolution (roughly 1966-1969) and increasing again during the early 70's. However, despite increasing trade at this time, foreign trade between China and Latin American represents only a minor portion of the foreign trade of either, and any further expansion faces many problems, primarily due to economic, not ideological problems.

¹⁸Wang Chien-hsun, op. cit., p. 29.

¹⁹Trade and Aid in 1972, p. 4.

ROLE OF NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY

Many of the Chinese trade missions that have visited Latin America have made their initial arrangements through the New China News Agency, which has performed a myriad of diplomatic and quasi-diplomatic functions in the area, particularly where diplomatic relations have not been established.

The New China News Agency is an anomaly among news agencies. In addition to news gathering and news dissemination functions, its personnel have performed roles as foreign diplomats, cultural attaches, consular officials, spies and general factotums for People's Republic of China state interests abroad.

Since such a large portion of Chinese contacts with Latin American have been through the New China News Agency, this part of the paper will examine its structure and role in Chinese official and unofficial efforts in the Southern Hemisphere.

The New China News Agency in its activity in Latin America has attempted to live up to a description given by Lu Ting-yi, long time key figure in the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party, when he said:

The New China News Agency, acting as the mouth and the ear of our people, the Party, and the government, must establish its own sources and contacts and must distribute news to the length and breadth of the world

in competition with capitalist news agencies, piercing through the capitalist blockade and monopoly broadening our country's influence and reporting on the true international life.²⁰

How well, and in what manner, has the New China News Agency performed these tasks in Latin America?

Background and History

The exact beginnings of the New China News Agency are lost in the clouds of questions surrounding the early years of Mao's People's Communism. According to an official source, it traces its origins to the Red China News Agency, a department within the Red China Newspaper Agency which was founded in 1932 in Mao's soviet in Jui-chin, Kiangsi Province.²¹

After the Communists were forced out of their Kiangsi redoubts by the Nationalists in 1934, the New China News Agency joined other Communist forces in the Long March to Yenan Province. There on September 1, 1937, after the Japanese invasion of China had made a united front with the Nationalists

²⁰Quoted from Ignatius Peng Yao, "The New China News Agency: How it Serves the Party," Journalism Quarterly, XL, 1 (Winter 1963), 84.

²¹Wang Chia-hua, "New China News Agency on the March: Articles in Commemoration of the Agency's Twentieth Anniversary," Peking: Hsin Wen Yu Chu Pan (News and Publishing:) August 25, 1957. Translated in Survey of the China Mainland Press (SCMP 1614/3). Yao, op. cit., p. 83, gives 1929 as the founding date.

acceptable, the name "Red China" was dropped in favor of "New China," in order to reduce tension with the Nationalists. In 1939, the New China News Agency was set up as an independent entity, with branches, correspondents, and its own reporting department.

The New China News Agency's overseas establishment has seen rapid expansion since the Communists' rise to power in 1948. That was the year the agency established its first overseas post in Prague, Czechoslovakia.²² As of 1972, the New China News Agency had fifty-seven foreign bureaus and offices, showing continuous world-wide growth from the twenty-one of 1957.

As one of the two official news agencies of the People's Republic of China, the New China News Agency operates as a Special Agency of the State Council (Cabinet).²³ Before the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, the New China News Agency was immediately subordinate to the State Council's Staff Office of Culture and Education.

²²Alan P. L. Liu, "Ideology and Information: Correspondents of the New China News Agency and Chinese Foreign Policy Making," *Journal of International Affairs*, XXVI, 2 (1972), 137. It is probable that NCNA had some representation in Moscow as early as the late 1930's.

²³The other news agency is the China News Service, in actuality a specialized arm of the New China News Agency, providing tailored news and propaganda to the Overseas Chinese community abroad.

As a result of reorganizations brought about by the Cultural Revolution, the staff offices have apparently been abolished, but at least two new supervisory bodies have evolved to take their place; the Cultural Group and the Scientific Educational Group.

The Cultural Group, which was first unveiled in 1971, when it hosted a reception for high ranking People's Republic of China and foreign guests, appears to have taken over most functions formerly performed by the Ministry of Culture. The presence of the Deputy Director of the New China News Agency (Shih Shao-hua) as its third ranking member is indicative of its responsibilities.²⁴ It is headed by Wu Te, a People's Liberation Army veteran and also a Vice-Chairman of the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee.²⁵

Wu Leng-hsi was head of the New China News Agency from 1952 until he was purged in 1967. He was succeeded, at least

²⁴External Information and Cultural Relations Programs - People's Republic of China (Washington, D. C.: Office of Research and Assessment, United States Information Agency, 1973), pp. 75-77 (hereafter cited as Cultural Relations Programs).

²⁵Other members, as indicated by the New China News Agency, Peking September 3, 1971, were Liu Hsien-chuan, Yu Hui-yung, Ti Fu-Tsai, Huang Hou-min, Hae Liang, and Wu Yin-hsion. Most appear to be from the People's Liberation Army.

officially, by Wang Wei-chen, who had returned to China after a year in a Brazilian prison for his escapades as a New China News Agency correspondent there, of which more later. His tenure was short, as he was also purged in February 1968.²⁶

Today, after the wave of purges and counter-purges that have gripped most People's Republic of China officialdom for the last few years, it is now possible to designate with some exactitude the official who heads the New China News Agency. Earlier, Shih Shae-hua, although officially credited only with the Deputy Directorship, was thought by some to be in actuality the Director.²⁷

The visit to China in September 1972 of Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka brought forth the unveiling of the new director of the agency, Chu Mu-chih.

Chu Mu-chih has been associated with the New China News Agency since the early days of the regime. He was installed as a deputy director in 1954, where he remained until the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. At that time he disappeared, suggesting that he had committed some form of error, but

²⁶ Ibid., p. 141-142.

²⁷ Liu, p. 136.

apparently his re-education and rehabilitation have been complete. Chu was active in the All-China Journalists Association, an organization whose present status is uncertain, and has headed delegations abroad.²⁸

Of particular interest is the fact that Chu led a delegation of People's Republic of China journalists to Latin America in 1960.²⁹

Representation in Latin America

The first recorded presence of New China News Agency representatives in Latin America came in 1959, when a four man delegation, headed by Yao Chen, visited there during the summer. Events in Cuba, where Fidel Castro's bands overthrew the Batista dictatorship, quickened People's Republic of China interest in the area.

Another delegation headed by Chu Mu-chih paid a return call to Cuba in 1960, and the New China News Agency established its first Latin American bureau in Havana in August 1960. The members of the Cuban bureau displayed their versatility by laying the groundwork for the recognition of the People's Republic of Castro's regime, which occurred in September 1960.³⁰

²⁸ Cultural Relations Programs, p. 145.

²⁹ Johnson, Communist China and Latin America, p. 10.

³⁰ Ibid.

Using Havana as a firm base, the New China News Agency began to spread its network in other Latin countries. By the end of 1960, it was operating in seven countries of the Southern Hemisphere: Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Peru and Venezuela. Additional offices were opened in Uruguay and Mexico in 1962 and 1963, respectively.³¹

By 1966, the agency had lost its official representatives in Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador and Venezuela, but still had a sizeable force of correspondents, official and unofficial, in Latin America.

By 1967, the New China News Agency had lost its representation in Costa Rica, Mexico, and Venezuela, and its Uruguayan office had been downgraded to stringer status rather than the bureau office that had formerly operated there.³²

This decline in the number of correspondents in Latin America was due to a number of factors. In addition to problems of host country hostility, which caused closings in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela, the Cultural Revolution at home

³¹
Ibid., pp. 10-11.

³² United States Information Agency, Office of Policy Research, Communist Propaganda Activities in Latin America - 1967, pp. 10-11.

TABLE 3

NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY
REPRESENTATIVES IN LATIN AMERICA - 1966

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
Argentina	Unofficial Stringer
Bolivia	Correspondent
Chile	Bureau Office
Columbia	Correspondent
Costa Rica	Stringer
Cuba	Regional Office
Mexico	Bureau Office
Peru	Stringer
Uruguay	Bureau Office
Venezuela	Stringer
Guyana	Unofficial Correspondent

Source: United States Information Agency, Office of Policy and Research, Communist Propaganda Organizations and Activities in Latin America During 1966, p. 20-21.

saw a large number of the staff recalled for re-education and participation in Cultural Revolution activities.³³

Correspondents that were sent to Latin America were professionals, either in the field of journalism or whatever functional area that required their disguise as journalists. Stringers tended to be either Overseas Chinese or natives of the country, with the principal criterion for selection being political reliability.

As the Cultural Revolution drew to a close, or at least abated in Mainland China, the People's Republic of China showed a renewed interest in expansion of its news network abroad, in keeping with its overall expansion in the diplomatic field. In an effort that began in 1969, representation was established or re-established in over 50 countries by the end of 1971. Among the important new posts opened was one at the United Nations where three New China News Agency representatives were accredited following the seating of the People's Republic of China.

By 1972, the network in Latin America was as depicted in Table Number 4.

³³ Cultural Relations Programs, op. cit., p. 148.

TABLE 4

NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY
REPRESENTATIVES IN LATIN AMERICA - 1972

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>STATUS</u>
Argentina	Regional bureau
Chile	Some mail distribution, no local representatives
Cuba	Regional bureau
Ecuador	Some mail distribution, no local representatives
Guyana	Small office established December 4, 1972
Jamaica	Material mailed in, no local representatives
Peru	Office opened 1972
Uruguay	Bureau office

Source: Cultural Relations Programs, pp. 162-173.

Recognition by Argentina of the People's Republic of China in February 1972 may lead to some expansion of the New China News Agency presence there. Also, the recent military revolution in Chile may well result in the closing of what was considered to be a key bureau in Santiago. The Havana office, which saw extraordinary growth prior to the Cultural Revolution, and served to oversee all propaganda activity in Latin America, was sharply curtailed during the Cultural Revolution as a result of differences between Castro and his erst-while Chinese allies. Although the New China News Agency presently maintains a presence in Havana, regional responsibilities have been greatly reduced or eliminated. In Mexico, although diplomatic relations have been established, no New China News Agency staffers have been present since a 1966 imbroglio detailed later in this paper.

To date, the People's Republic of China has not concluded any international news agency agreements with any Latin country other than Cuba. These agreements, which received emphasis primarily in the early 1960's, have been concluded with 13 nations, ten of which are outside the Sino-Soviet bloc.³⁴

³⁴ Douglas M. Johnston and Hungdah Chiu, Agreements of the People's Republic of China 1949-1967 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), and Cultural Relations Programs, p. 196. Rollie E. Poppino, in International Communism in Latin America, states that the New China News Agency and Prensa Latina, Cuban based news agency, reached an exchange agreement in 1960.

Although data is not available to support the assertion, it can be surmised that more of these agreements exist than have yet come to light, as the New China News Agency carries on an extensive news exchange with other bloc members.

Also, it is quite probable that covert stringers or unofficial correspondents are active in countries other than those enumerated, especially when considering New China News Agency access to potential sources within the large and active pro-Marxist intellectual community in most Latin American countries.

New China News Agency - Overt Functions

If the New China News Agency is "the Party's eyes and tongue," as it was described by Lu Ting-i, at one time Director of the People's Republic of China Department of Propaganda, how does it go about "seeing and speaking" in Latin America?³⁵

It would appear that the New China News Agency activities, at least its overt activities, could be broadly defined as news collection, news dissemination, and news control. With the exception of the latter, there would be little apparent difference from the functions of any international news service. Such is not

³⁵ Quoted in Frederick T. C. Yu, Mass Persuasion in Communist China (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1964), p. 120.

the case. In addition to its normal "news" service, personnel have operated as diplomats, trade envoys, and as a primary source of intelligence for their masters in Peking.

However, before turning to some of New China News Agency's more esoteric functions, its more mundane duties should be mentioned.

Under the heading of news collection, New China News Agency representation in Latin America has already been described. As previously noted, no news exchange agreements exist except with Cuba. However, two additional sources of news input are available to the agency; monitoring of foreign radio broadcasts, and translation of important foreign periodicals and newspapers.

As early as 1947, the New China News Agency claimed that it was monitoring the broadcasts of more than 40 stations, representing 30 foreign news agencies, and recording an input of more than 300,000 words each day.³⁶

Translation of foreign documents is also an important source of information. Agency staffers are responsible for collecting

³⁶Johnson, China and Latin America, p. 10.

magazines and other publications in Latin America, as well as in other foreign countries, for forwarding to Peking for analysis by the Chinese intelligence community.

This information, once received in Peking, serves manifold purposes. Some is disseminated in special publications for the information of government and party leaders. The bulk of the monitored foreign news is published in two classified news publications, one intended for middle-level officials and one for the highest leaders in the People's Republic.³⁷ Some is reprocessed to appear as propaganda, both for internal and external consumption.

Thus, the New China News Agency serves as the screen through which the perception of China's leaders about Latin America, as well as the rest of the world, are filtered.

The image that China, through its propaganda releases, presents to the world is also subject to the same filter. A most cursory reading of Peking Review, China's most prestigious propaganda publication, would reveal many references to articles and news gleaned from Latin American publications of all political persuasions.³⁸ An example is provided by New China News

³⁷Liu, p. 136.

³⁸See, for instance, the treatment of the question off-shore sovereignty of Latin American nations in Peking Review, No. 3, January 19, 1973, pp. 6-7.

Agency's circulation in August 1971, of a resolution that originally appeared in A Classe Operaria, a Brazilian revolutionary publication.³⁹

In the area of news and propaganda dissemination to target Latin American countries, the New China News Agency utilizes a multi-media approach. This will be discussed further in the next chapter.

It also serves as a source for printed propaganda, released where possible through local People's Republic of China embassies. All Chinese embassies normally issue a daily bulletin, either through an information officer, who is normally a New China News Agency representative, or through a cultural affairs officer, who may not work for the Agency.⁴⁰

The New China News Agency has been active in many areas other than news gathering and dissemination. Correspondents have frequently performed functions normally discharged by consular officials, such as handling trade and visa problems. In Cuba and Ghana, the arrival of the New China News Agency personnel preceded the establishment of diplomatic relations

³⁹Cited in Cecil Johnson, "China and Latin America: New Ties and Tactics," Problems of Communism, XXI, 4. (July-August 1972), p. 65.

⁴⁰Cultural Relations Programs, p. 151.

between those countries and the People's Republic of China. Facilities are commonly used to arrange cultural exchange programs of all sorts, which result in the visits to China and Latin America by groups of all types, and which include many non-communist visits to China. Representatives in Brazil, before Goulart's overthrow, were known to be laying the groundwork for recognition of the People's Republic of China.

The negotiations for the recognition of Peking by Castro were handled by Tseng Tao, a New China News Agency correspondent there.⁴¹ This situation has had parallels in other dealings with Third World nations. Kao Liang, an important correspondent in Dar Es Salaam, likewise negotiated Burundi's recognition of Peking.

Representatives perform another important function in the foreign relations area. Their role as newsmen enables New China News Agency reporters to contact key government officials and members of significant opposition groups throughout Latin America, and thus probe attitudes toward the People's Republic of China. In addition, as Peking's local voice, they can relay to various elites Chinese viewpoints, interests, and possibilities of psychic and materiel aid.⁴²

⁴¹Liu, op. cit., p. 143.

⁴²Ibid., p. 143.

These contacts by correspondents with specific elite groups in Latin America complement the People's Republic of China's extensive propaganda campaign, and enables New China News Agency men to translate propaganda into concrete actions. While many of these actions possess at least a surface legitimacy, many do not. Chinese predilection for intrigue has had a major impact on Peking's relationships with Latin America and is worthy of more detailed examination.

Clandestine Activities

The agency's role as an agent for subversion, and resulting action against it by Latin American governments, began almost simultaneously with its arrival. On the night of June 14, 1963, Argentina raided and closed the local office and arrested Juan Gilman, the resident agent, for suspected subversion. Following protests by the All-China Association of Journalists and the International Organization of Journalists to then-President Guido, he was freed in August of that year. Local reports indicated that although he was released for lack of evidence, a large cache of propaganda documents had been confiscated.⁴³

⁴³"Communist China in Latin America," Este & Oeste, December 1966, translated in Joint Research Publication Service. Translations on International Communist Developments, No. 940, p. 75-91.

The manager in Ecuador, Alejandro Roma, was arrested May 23, 1963, and subsequently released with a compatriot in July of that year, when police closed the office.

In Venezuela, amidst mounting Communist-inspired terror, police arrested Humberto Rojas in late December 1963. He was released in January 1964, following a protest to President Betancourt by the All-China Association of Journalists.⁴⁴

A similar case occurred in Brazil in 1964, involving the previously mentioned Wang Wei-chen, another New China News Agency correspondent named Chu Chi-Tung, and seven members of a Chinese trade delegation. Wang and Chu had arrived in Brazil in 1961, and had been provided various facilities by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Wang had been a correspondent in North Vietnam prior to his Brazilian duties. Apparently, he spoke neither English or Portuguese, and so was assigned Chu, a young interpreter and a recent journalism or foreign language graduate.⁴⁵

Wang, Chu and their compatriots were arrested by Brazilian officials following the ouster of the left-leaning President Goulart, and charged with espionage. Police searchers produced "sabotage

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 91.

⁴⁵Liu, op. cit., p. 141.

plans," supposedly made with the assistance of the China-Brazil Cultural Institution, and a cache of arms. All nine were convicted and imprisoned.⁴⁶

This action brought loud and vociferous protest by the People's Republic of China. Peking Review, quoting an official release, charged that the whole affair was a United States - inspired frame-up:

It must be pointed out that this shocking frame-up of the Chinese personnel was engineered from the beginning to end by U. S. imperialism. In making false charges against the Chinese personnel by taking advantage of the military coup d'etat it brought about in Brazil, U. S. imperialism, which has stopped at nothing in showing hostility to and committing aggression against China, was obviously attempting to impair China's international prestige and undermine China's growing relations of friendship with Brazil and other Latin American peoples⁴⁷

Chinese ire at the overthrow of Goulart and the resulting arrest and conviction of their news and trade representatives was understandable. Goulart, who succeeded the mercurial Janio Quadros as Brazil's president, was a known leftist whose pronounced sympathies for the Chinese were already apparent from trade negotiations.

⁴⁶Johnson, China and Latin America, p. 12.

⁴⁷"China Protests to Brazilian Authorities," Peking Review, No. 1, January 1, 1967, p. 7.

Finally, after a year of imprisonment and continuing protests, all nine were expelled from Brazil. Wang returned to China as a national hero. He then began his climb to his short-lived tenure as head of the New China News Agency noted earlier in this paper. His later downfall was attributed to charges that he "betrayed his soul" to Brazilian police while in custody, charges apparently made by his old interpreter Chu, and he was then denounced by various Red Guard groups.⁴⁸

Abortive attempts at subversion in Latin America by other staffers did not abate, regardless of their embarrassing consequences. Three years later, this time in Mexico, New China News Agency representatives were accused of channeling funds to finance rebellion among the Mexican people. The local bureau chief protested against "this shameless vilification and serious political provocation against China," stating that the real aim of the Mexican action was "to prevent the spreading of Mao Tse-Tung's thought in Mexico."⁴⁹

According to press reports, New China News Agency activities had come to light as Mexican authorities broke a plot

⁴⁸Liu, op. cit., p. 141-142.

⁴⁹"Chinese and Mexico," SCMP, August 3, 1967, pp. 37-38.

to establish a "Popular-Socialist" regime. Mexican police reported that tons of propaganda were seized as a bookstore, operating center for the plot, was raided.⁵⁰ The raid also revealed that the New China News Agency had been subsidizing the would-be rebels to the tune of \$1,680 per month. Although thirteen persons were arrested, two plotters (Fuentes-Gutierrez and Emery Valle) had fled to China shortly before the plot was broken.⁵¹

Pien Cheng, chief correspondent in Mexico City, and his Chinese assistants were not to be found in Mexico. To their good fortune, they had returned to China in November 1966, ostensibly to participate in the Cultural Revolution.

Secure in Peking, they vehemently denied any connection with the plot, and, through New China News Agency, released a barrage of denunciation on Mexico, the United States and the Soviets for their attempts "to undermine the friendship between Chinese and Mexican people."⁵²

Bolivia was the next nation to become disenchanted with the presence of Chinese correspondents. The military regime under Barrientos began a general policy of Communist suppression

⁵⁰James Reston, "Mexico City: The Neighbors Have Problems, Too," The New York Times, July 23, 1967, Sec. IV, p. 8-3.

⁵¹"Mexico Arrests 13, Links China to Plot," The New York Times, July 20, 1967, p. 1.

⁵²Johnson, Communist China and Latin America, pp. 278-279.

following an abortive miners strike, and arrested a sizeable number of local communists in January 1967. Another group was arrested in February, including among its unfortunates Jorge Echazu Aborado, New China News Agency's Bolivian correspondent. A release of February 27 protested his arrest and charged that his arrest violated the freedom of the press.⁵³ Regardless of Peking's protests, the Bolivians expelled Aborado, despite his non-Chinese origins.⁵⁴

To judge the New China News Agency strictly as a news-gatherer would be overly simplistic in view of its multitude of other responsibilities. However, it has served as an important device for providing the raw material from which Chinese leaders judge events and personalities in Latin America. The objectivity of their reporting to Peking is reinforced by the large monitoring activity that the New China News Agency conducts, although the unbiased output from both sources is very limited in its internal circulation in the People's Republic of China. However, this drawback would seem of little consequence, as long as relatively few decision makers are required to have an uncolored source of

⁵³Ibid., p. 227.

⁵⁴Cultural Relations Programs, p. 156.

news about Latin American affairs. The hierarchical and authoritative structure of the People's Republic governing apparatus reduces the requirement to one of keeping the "men at the top" correctly informed, without providing a wide base of information to lower levels in the hierarchy.

However, neither New China News Agency representatives in Latin America nor their colleagues who process news in Peking can escape the problems posed by conflicting ideology and information. Regardless of how persistent and alert these correspondents are in their coverage, they function within the restrictions of a world view defined by them and their leaders. The strength of ideological commitment is well demonstrated by the fact that no New China News Agency representative has ever defected to the West.

News dissemination for the New China News Agency in the Southern Hemisphere has meant propaganda dissemination. If efficiency is equated to volume, it has earned a number of credits.

New China News Agency's quasi-diplomatic functions in Latin America, as well as in other Third World nations, have been an important instrument in operationalizing People's Republic of China's foreign policy. As several writers have noted, when New China News Agency men arrive, diplomatic recognition usually follows. The interchangeability of news and diplomatic

functions is illustrated by two of its most distinguished alumni. Chiao Kuan-hua, chief delegate to the United Nations General Assembly, and Huang Hua, permanent representative to the United Nations Security Council and the first ambassador to Canada, were prominent in agency affairs for years.⁵⁵ The groundwork laid by its members in expanding formal recognition in the Third World, and Latin America, has been well done.

New China News Agency's record in the support of subversive activities would at first glance seem to be one of dismal failure. However, as is the case with covert activities by operators of any ideological persuasion, failures are easy to perceive. Success may well go unheralded. The problems caused by discovery of a portion of activity in this area are beside the point, if it has enjoyed other victories in communicating with and subsidizing its friends in Latin America. In this regard, it is also important to remember that accusations against the Chinese served important political aims of those host countries that have denounced the New China News Agency and its correspondents.

The New China News Agency, as a political tool, is not affected by its failures. Its goals are long term, and designed to serve Chinese long term goals, regardless of temporary setbacks.

⁵⁵Liu, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

Operating in the strange and often hostile environment of Latin America, performing a variety of tasks that would leave a United Press or Reuters man gasping, the agency has served China well on the quasi-diplomatic front.

Other activities relating to propaganda and cultural activities will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHINA'S NEW "OPEN DOOR" IN LATIN AMERICA

Chinese diplomatic and trade activities languished during the late 1960's. Trade activity, never on a very sure footing, fell as China decreased her imports of agricultural products from Latin America.

Efforts to find a Latin market for the limited quantities and variety of Chinese goods were unsuccessful, and therefore an adverse balance of payments problem existed. On the Latin side, widespread hostility to the Chinese revolutionary vision, as well as fear of possible Yankee reprisals, served to limit any inclination of Latin states to increase contacts.

For their part, the Chinese were engaged in an internal problem of great magnitude. The Cultural Revolution served to force Chinese thought inward, and prevented any new foreign policy initiatives. As has been shown, Chinese efforts were directed primarily at Communist parties, not nation-states, during this period of turmoil.

However, toward the close of the 1960's, the Chinese were ready to take a new look at their international policies, as well as their highly vocal support for heterogeneous groups engaged in "People's War" in the Southern Hemisphere.

The Cultural Revolution, at least a major portion of it, was behind them. Other, and equally pressing, problems had arisen, as China perceived an increasing threat to its existence in the Soviet presence and activities along its northern borders with the Soviet Union. Although stronger both politically and militarily than at any other stage of recent development, the Chinese were obviously at a disadvantage in any direct confrontation with the Russians. China was badly in need of friends in the international community. Its possession of a growing stockpile of nuclear weapons, among the things, had increased internal pressures to make China's voice heard in the world as a co-equal with other great powers. Its foreign policy, if it can so be called, had left Chinese relationships with most nations in a limbo, caused by Chinese support of People's War, and through Chinese disinterest during the period of the Cultural Revolution.

Equally important, a number of substantial opportunities on the international scene were becoming apparent to the Chinese. American desire for disengagement in the Far East, specifically in Viet Nam, had served to bring about the Nixon Doctrine. Even

earlier, various initiatives had been made to reduce United States - Chinese tensions. China's possession of nuclear weapons had evoked a new respect if not friendliness, in many nations of the Third World. In the United Nations the charade of the Republic of China representing all of China was becoming increasingly distasteful to many nations.⁵⁶

All of these disparate forces made themselves felt on Chinese policy makers and on Chinese propagandists. Daniel Tretiak's content analysis of Peking Review showed a remarkable return to its pre-cultural revolution format since 1967.⁵⁷ Overall, hostility toward the United States, and toward many nations in the Third World, was dropping, presaging an improvement in China's inter-state relationships. As Tretiak accurately predicted, support for "Wars of National Liberation" had declined, and China clearly "turned out" in its foreign relations.⁵⁸

Just as it takes two to tango, it also takes two to establish diplomatic recognition. Important as it was, internal Chinese

⁵⁶For a more complete exposition of the reasons for the shift in Chinese policy, see Alan S. Whiting, "China's New Diplomacy, A Symposium," Problems of Communism, XX, 6 (November-December 1971), 2-6.

⁵⁷Daniel Tretiak, "Is China 'Turning Out?'" Asian Survey, XI, 3 (March 1970), p. 225.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, p. 237.

readiness to change its international posture would have been fruitless without an equal willingness on the part of other members of the international community to accept China as a respectable nation-state. Without examining all of the reasons, some of which have been previously stated, it is important to enumerate some of the main points of the consensus that was appearing among non-communist scholars and policy makers about China. The main points of this consensus have been ably presented by Stephen Fitzgerald:

China is not committed to broad territorial expansionism; it appears to be 'pre-disposed' to keep its armed forces within its own boundaries, its primary stress is on defense rather than offense, it does not ignore the possible risks and costs of large-scale conventional war, it opposes the use of Chinese forces to fight other revolutionaries' battles for them, in 'pressure and probes' against its neighbors its use of force is carefully calculated and controlled, and in 'crisis situations' it tends to act with considerable prudence and caution, and repeatedly it has moved to check escalation when there has appeared to be a serious risk of major conflict.⁵⁹

In regard to Sino-Latin American relations, what form did the new Chinese diplomacy assume? As elsewhere in the Third World, the Chinese shifted rapidly away from the unsuccessful

⁵⁹Stephen Fitzgerald, "China in the Next Decade: An End to Isolation?" Australian Journal of Politics and History, XVIII, 1 (April 1971), 34. Although this consensus is not shared by all, it certainly would seem to represent the majority view, at least of American scholars. For an exception to this view, see Franz Michael, "A Design for Aggression," Problems of Communism, XX, 1 (January-April 1971), 62-68.

and exacerbating stress on "People's War," and substituted a much more palative mixture of nationalist and anti-great power themes.

Strenuous efforts were made to woo Latin countries and "normalize" relations.

Chinese efforts to portray themselves as friends of small nations caught between Soviet and American imperialist traps is ably expressed in a Peking Review article of 29 January 1971:

The struggle of the Latin American countries and peoples against U. S. imperialist control and aggression and for the defense of their national interests and state sovereignty is surging ahead vigorously . . . In the world today, more and more small and medium sized countries are rising against the doctrine of big-nation hegemony. Nations, big or small, should be equals without distinction. But one or two superpowers consider themselves entitled to order other nations about, bully them and damage their interests. Who gave them this "right"?⁶⁰

The foregoing amply illustrates the metamorphosis of the earlier cry of "people's war" into one against "U. S. imperialism." This metamorphosis was necessary if earlier Maoist thought was to be reconciled with China's search for a position of power and influence in the world.⁶¹

⁶⁰"Down with the Doctrine of Big Nation Hegemony," Peking Review, No. 4, January 29, 1971, p. 6.

⁶¹Deidre Mead Ryan, "The Decline of the Armed Struggle Tactic in Chinese Foreign Policy," Current Scene, December 1972, p. 10.

A very important factor in the resurgence of Chinese presence in Latin America was the change in United States policy toward China. President Nixon's desire to reduce tension with China fell on eager ears in Latin America. Latin American governments, previously doubtful of any approaches to China, could now respond quickly to Chinese overtures, and in some instances, to initiate them. This change in the Latin American posture is most readily illustrated by the voting on the admission of Peking into the United Nations. In 1970, only Chile and Cuba had supported China's admission. In 1971, seven nations (Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Guyana, Mexico, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago) voted for admission.⁶²

Other internal factors have also played a large role in Latin American receptivity to the Chinese. Domestic pressures for independence in foreign policy and trade, the desire to establish new, non-United States markets for expanding industry, coupled with "anti-U. S." feelings, made it relatively easy for improvement to take place.

⁶²Johnson, "China and Latin America: New Ties and Tactics," Problems of Communism, XXI, 4 (July-August 1972), p. 56.

The most significant changes in South America have occurred in Chile and Peru. In Chile, Chinese delight at seeing an anti-United States Marxist regime firmly in power was initially mingled with distress at the non-Maoist approach that had installed President Allende. However, ideological differences were soon submerged, if not forgotten. Diplomatic relations were established in December 1970, with a commercial agreement following in 1971.⁶³

In Peru, initial Chinese repugnance toward the military regime that had come to power in 1968 was overcome, as the Chinese grew to appreciate the possibility for political and economic gains to be made there. As related previously, Peruvian desire for a trade agreement was satisfied in June 1971, with the agreement calling for the export to China of large quantities of fish meal and metals. Diplomatic relations followed soon after, in November 1971.⁶⁴

Even relations with Cuba thawed. In December 1970, a new Chinese ambassador arrived (his predecessor had departed during the Cultural Revolution, never to return) and immediately set about to repair Sino-Cuban relations, at least on the state level. Basic differences in revolutionary approaches will probably preclude much improvement on the ideological scene.⁶⁵

⁶³Ibid., pp. 59-60.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 60.

⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 56-57.

Renewed trade attempts have also been partially successful. Trade in 1971 increased by 287% over the 1970 figure, while total Chinese world trade increased only by 9%. Granted, almost any increase would result in large rise in percentages, but there is still no denying the effects of recent Chinese interest. Mexico, Argentina, Guyana, and Venezuela have explored further trade possibilities with the Chinese. For example, in October 1972, Argentina negotiated a sale of 100,000 tons of maize, in addition to an earlier agreement for 500,000 tons of wheat. In November, Jamaica dispatched an eight-man trade delegation, with sugar and cocoa sales in mind. Also in November the head of the Venezuelan Institute of Foreign Trade arrived in Peking. Even Brazil, which has maintained a staunchly anti-People's Republic of China foreign policy, was subject to rumors of impending change in that policy, particularly after a trade delegation returned home from China with glowing tales of opportunities in the China trade.⁶⁶

China has been eager to find areas of mutual interest with the Latin American nations on the international scene, especially when Chinese support can be offered at little cost. A good case in point is the Chinese support for 200 mile off-shore sovereignty, sought by many Latin American nations. In rallying to this cause, Peking Review said:

⁶⁶Latin American Digest, January 1973, pp. 18-19.

Imperialism has always regarded other countries' territorial waters as its own "inland lake" and amassed wealth by stealing their resources. U. S. fishing boats have long been continually intruding into the territorial seas of the Latin American countries.

Further:

Soviet revisionist social imperialism seeking to infiltrate and expand in Latin America by taking advantage of U. S. imperialism's shaky position as the overlord there, has also tried in every way to unreasonably limit the breadth of the various countries' territorial waters . . . ⁶⁷

On the other hand, despite Chinese diplomatic gains, they have not completely forgotten the pro-Chinese Communist parties and other revolutionaries. Messages of support and solidarity still are exchanged. Nevertheless, the Chinese are clearly taking a much less aggressive stance than previously. Although their local allies are not forgotten, they receive less and less play in Chinese propaganda. ⁶⁸

This willingness on the part of the Chinese clearly entails Chinese endorsement of the "ruling circles" in Latin American countries, provided they show at least some support, however token, for the Chinese struggle against the two "superpowers." ⁶⁹

⁶⁷"Struggle to Safeguard Marine Resources," Peking Review, No. 3, January 19, 1973, pp. 6-7.

⁶⁸Johnson, New Ties and Tactics, p. 65.

⁶⁹Gene Gregory Geneva, "Peking's Latin Beat," Far Eastern Economic Review, September 18, 1971, p. 56.

The same issue of Peking Review which hailed the visit of President Nixon to China also noted with satisfaction the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Mexico and Argentina. A communique carried by Peking Review shows the appeal being used in efforts to "normalize" relations with Latin America. Paragraph three stated:

The Chinese government supports the firm position of Mexico and the Latin American states on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and holds that equality and mutual benefit . . . The Government of the Argentine Republic recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.

Further, and of particular interest to the Argentines:

The Government of the People's Republic of China recognizes the right of jurisdiction of the Argentine Republic over the maritime zone adjacent to its coasts within the limit of 200 nautical miles. ⁷⁰

The communique concluded by noting that the two nations had agreed to adopt active measures to increase their trade.

Other agreements on establishing diplomatic relations were virtual carbon copies of those quoted above. ⁷¹ Recognition of Chinese authority as the sole legal government of China was the

⁷⁰"Diplomatic Relations Established Between China and Argentina," Peking Review, No. 7-8, February 25, 1972, pp. 26-27.

⁷¹See, for instance, "China and Jamaica Establish Diplomatic Relations," Peking Review, No. 48, December 1, 1972, p. 4.

usual quid pro quo extracted in exchange for Chinese support of whatever international issue seemed most pressing to the Latin national assessment.

This activity was a far cry from the zealous support of down-trodden peasants that the doctrine of "People's War" had generated. It was also eminently more successful. By the close of 1972, full diplomatic recognition had been attained with Chile, Peru, Mexico, Argentina, Guyana, and Jamaica. Trade relations, although small in dollars, were improving. Most important, China had established legitimate international ties, ties that could be used to generate support in forums such as the United Nations, and which also could be used to effectively further its efforts with other members of the Third World in matters of mutual interest.

China was no longer isolated and at the mercy of either the Soviets or the United States in the international framework. Its new-found "statesmanship" brought prestige and power, compared to the ridicule and failure of People's War. The forces of Real Politik seemingly have conquered Marxist-Maoist ideological fervor.

CHAPTER V

CHINESE "PEOPLE TO PEOPLE" PROGRAMS IN LATIN AMERICA

BACKGROUND

Closely interwoven with Chinese diplomatic activity on the state-to-state level, and with Chinese ideological appeals on a party-to-party level, have been Peking's "people-to-people" approaches to Latin America. Called by various names, such as "cultural exchange," "propaganda," "cultural diplomacy," or "cultural relations," the topic has perhaps been best defined by Richard Walker as: "The exchange of information, ideas, persons, and culture as a systematic and unified arm of foreign policy."¹

As Walker points out in a later work, the People's Republic of China has displayed a remarkable capability for various cultural contacts abroad in an attempt to build an image of Chinese power

¹Richard L. Walker, "The Developing Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Asia," George L. Anderson, ed., Issues and Conflicts (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press), 1959, p. 45.

and prestige in the world. Its leaders have demonstrated a formidable ability to effectively employ "people-to-people" programs to maximize Chinese influence abroad.²

In so using cultural contact, which in Western democracies would generally be outside the realm of direct governmental control, the Chinese have drawn heavily on Communist precepts and Soviet examples. After all, both Lenin and Trotsky appreciated the role that cultural programs could play in winning new friends abroad for the revolution. Lenin is reported to have said "the ballet, the theater, the opera and the expositions of fresh and novel painting and sculpture present evidence to many in foreign lands, that the Bolsheviks are not such terrible barbarians as they are supposed to be."³ And Trotsky claimed that Soviet proletarian culture "was not an aristocratic one for a privileged minority, but a mass culture, a universal and popular one."⁴ The parallel objectives of both the Soviet Union and the People's

²Richard L. Walker, "Peking's Approach to the Outside World," in Frank W. Traeger and William Henderson, eds., Communist China, 1949-1969: A Twenty-Year Appraisal (New York: New York University Press, 1970), p. 280.

³V. I. Lenin, La cultura y la revolucion cultural, Moscow: Editorial Progress, 1962, translated and quoted in Bayram Riza and Catherine Quirk, "Cultural Relations between the Soviet Union and Latin America," in F. Gregory Oswald and Anthony J. Strover, eds., The Soviet Union and Latin America (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 31.

⁴Leon Trotsky, Literature and Revolution (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), pp. 192-93.

Republic of China in their cultural approach has been to undermine Western influences; to present an appealing picture of life in their respective countries; to establish links to the various cultural, scientific and academic communities; and to use cultural appeals in an attempt to influence non-communist political leaders in Latin America.⁵

If such programs have been important to the Soviets, they have probably been even more important to the Chinese, at least during a major portion of their inter-relationships with Latin America.

In the absence of strong political and economic relationships with most Latin countries, a situation that prevailed until very recently, the Chinese have relied heavily on "people-to-people" programs to make themselves known and respected. This technique has been assisted by the responsiveness of many Latin American intellectuals, who were both knowledgeable of and sympathetic to Marxist interpretation of the world, and who also felt that they, like the Chinese, represented a tradition that was spiritually and culturally superior to that of the overly-materialistic United States. The Chinese cry for struggle against "imperialism," which was in reality a denunciation of the United States, and for "revolution" struck a responsive chord for their own endeavors.⁶

⁵Bayram Riza and Catherine Quirk, p. 30. These objectives sharpened to include each other as competitive targets following the Sino-Soviet break.

⁶Ratliff, "China and Latin America," p. 859.

THE PERIOD OF THE GUIDED TOUR

The core tactic utilized by Peking during the early years in Latin America was one that can best be described as the "guided tour" approach. This approach, which was widely used by the Chinese on a world-wide basis up to approximately 1960, consisted of conducting carefully selected visitors throughout equally carefully selected portions of the People's Republic. Herbert Passin has described the methods by which these "tourists" saw China as follows:

"Most of the visitors come on whirlwind tours in delegations, or organized groups, usually under their own leader and at the invitation of some Chinese organization. They are taken in hand for a carefully organized itinerary with guides and interpreters, and, in the case of important delegations, by some high-ranking person or representative of the appropriate field. For the period of his stay, which may vary from a week to two months - the average is probably "three weeks" - the visitor is treated as an honored guest. He is shown every courtesy, surrounded by luxury, and given every attention."⁷

As Passin also noted, the majority of these visitors were drawn from the most influential and articulate elites in their own countries, and their visits to China carried enormously greater impact than would a much larger group of ordinary tourists.⁸

⁷Herbert Passin, *China's Cultural Diplomacy* (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1963), p. 9.

⁸Ibid., p. 8.

Between 1949 and 1960, the number of visitors from Latin America rose dramatically from less than ten per year to more than five hundred.

The large number of visitors in 1952 were principally in attendance at the Asian and Pacific Regions Peace Conference that was held in Peking in June and October 1952. The high tide of 1960 has not been reached since. In fact, there was a general decline during the 1960's of Latin visitors to China.

Up to 1958, the Chinese had tended to draw most of their Latin visitors from the larger and more democratic Latin American nations. As the following chart illustrates, that shifted in the early 1960's.

As is obvious from the table, the end of the period saw an influx of Cubans and Brazilians, with a major decline in the number of visitors from other countries. This influx is readily explained by China's interest in both Castro's revolution and the left-leaning Quadros-Goulart governments in Brazil.

During the early years, the composition of the visiting delegations was weighed heavily toward peace and cultural groups. This composition changed in the mid-50's, with more emphasis on labor and professional groups. By the close of the period, the Chinese were inviting a broad spectrum of cultural, labor, professional, student, political, and youth groups to see the sights of China.

TABLE 5

LATIN VISITORS TO COMMUNIST CHINA

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
1949-51	2-10
1952	120
1953	40
1954	35
1955	65
1956	90
1957	115
1958	120
1959	400
1960	500

Source: Data from Ratliff, "Chinese Communist Cultural Diplomacy Toward Latin America," Hispanic American Historical Review, 49 (February 1969), 57-58. Figures represent minimums, since they were based on New China News Agency reports and undoubtedly do not include all visitors, especially those wishing to avoid any publicity about their trips.

TABLE 6

LATIN VISITORS TO COMMUNIST CHINA BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>
Cuba	25+	100+	175+
Brazil	30+	100+	50+
Argentina	45+	70+	16+
Chile	45+	65+	15+
Bolivia	50+	20+	6+
Peru	35+	21+	7+
Columbia	35+	15+	1+
Uruguay	30+	12+	2
Venezuela	25+	22+	12+
Mexico	25+	17+	5+

Source: Ratliff, "Chinese Communist Cultural Diplomacy," p. 59. These were the ten countries sending the most visitors to China during the period.

Invitations to visit China were usually extended by such organizations as the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the China Peace Committee, the Sino-Latin American Friendship Association, and other front groups that were supposedly free of the Communist Party.

Although noteworthy Latin Communists did visit China, the Chinese took care to insure that the majority of their visitors were not communists, even if they were generally leftist and anti-American.

Two important labor leaders were among the first Latins to visit China. In 1949, Vincente Lombardo Toledano, president of the Confederation of Latin American Workers, and Lagaro Pena, Secretary General of the Confederation of Cuban Workers, visited Peking after first touring Moscow. The purpose of their visit was to attend the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australian Countries, which was held in November 1949 in Peking.⁹

Other labor delegations followed. Beginning in 1955, labor delegates from several Latin American nations were normally in attendance at May Day celebrations and other labor-oriented

⁹Ibid., p. 61.

festive occasions. During the 1960 World Federation of Trade Unions Conference, a total of seventeen Latin American nations were represented.¹⁰

Among the many who visited China as "cultural" guests, Pablo Neruda was perhaps the most prominent. He visited China twice in the period, in 1951 and 1957.

The Chinese also exerted a great effort to bring professionals, particularly journalists, to China. In 1956, the Chinese received a delegation of lawyers from Argentina, Brazil and Chile; journalists from Brazil, Bolivia, Mexico and Peru; and a group of Argentine doctors.

Politicians were among the last groups to receive emphasis by the Chinese, beginning in the 1950's. Salvador Allende visited China in 1959. Five members of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies attended the 1956 meeting of the Chinese National People's Congress. However, 1959 was a boom year for Latin politicians, as more than a dozen parliamentary delegations made their way to Peking. Peru, Columbia, and Uruguay led the list, having 26, 16, and 6 members of their parliaments visit China. The most prominent

¹⁰ Latin Representatives came from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guadelupe, Haiti, Honduras, Martinique, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

of the visitors was a former Mexican president, Emilio Portes Gil. Joao Goulart, Brazilian Vice President, did not make the tour until 1961, although originally scheduled for 1960.¹¹

Changes in Peking's policy line after approximately 1960, and later the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution, were to seriously disrupt China's prospering flow of foreign visitors. As noted earlier, the shift to a doctrine of People's War served to alienate both Latin American governments and many Latin leftists. China's belligerent attitude made cultural diplomacy less workable, and less suited to the achievement of Chinese foreign policy goals. Latin governments were less willing to allow visits to a country that had announced its avowed intention of aiding their downfall. Latin leftists, for the most part, either sided with Moscow in the verbal fireworks of the period, or attempted to maintain a "plague on both your houses" attitude.

With the appearance of the Cultural Revolution, the already deceased flow of foreign visitors dwindled to almost nil, as did Chinese participation in cultural and sports delegations from Communist countries to Latin America.¹² It would be an

¹¹Ibid., p. 62.

¹²The United States Information Agency, Office of Policy and Research Pamphlet, Communist Propaganda Activities in Latin America - 1967, shows no Chinese participation in communist cultural groups sent to Latin America in that year.

understatement to say that the Chinese were very busy at home during this period, and in no mood to expose the turmoil within China to foreign eyes.

People to people programs work best when there is at least some measure of amicable intercourse on the state-to-state level. Accordingly, the shift in the early 1970's away from the espousal of People's War, and to a state-to-state offensive, predictably brought renewed emphasis on visits to the People's Republic.

Since the rapprochement with the United States, Latin Americans have again begun to beat a path to Peking. Juan Bosch, former president of the Dominican Republic, went in 1969. In 1971 and 1972, Peruvian and Chilean visitors were plentiful. Chilean leftist parties went in large groups, including among them Radomiro Tomic, the 1970 presidential candidate of the Christian Democratic Party. Carlos Altamirano, general secretary of Allende's Socialist Party, was in China in 1972.¹³ By 1973, relations between the Latin American countries and China had stabilized to such an extent that President Luis Echeverria of Mexico was among the foreign heads of state received and feted by the Chinese leadership.¹⁴

¹³Ratliff, "China and Latin America," pp. 859-60.

¹⁴"President Echeverria's Visit," Asia Research Bulletin, II, 12 (May 1973), 1764.

The flow of cultural visits was not all one way. Prior to the freeze of the middle 1960's, many Chinese cultural delegations visited Latin America. The first of these delegations arrived in 1953, when two Chinese were delegates to the American Continental Congress of Culture held in Chile. The first large group was an 85-member folk group that toured Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay in 1956. In late 1958 and early 1959, another large group, this time acrobats, performed in the same countries. Attempts to visit Mexico were made, but apparently were frustrated by the Mexican Government.¹⁵ A large operatic group visited Columbia, Cuba, and Venezuela in 1960, and were received by President Betancourt while in Venezuela.¹⁶ Youth delegations also visited Latin America in 1960, with three delegations going to Chile.

During their tours, the leading members of the delegations met political leaders and attended legislative assemblies in the various countries visited. Meetings with prominent people in all walks of life often generated very favorable impressions on their hosts.¹⁷

¹⁵ U. S. Congress. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 1st Session, 89th Congress, Red Chinese Infiltration into Latin America, Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office, 1965, p. 41.

¹⁶ Ratliff, "Communist Chinese Cultural Diplomacy," op. cit., p. 67.

¹⁷ See, for example, Hispanic American Report, December 1958, p. 695, which details a Chinese cultural group being held over in Montevideo by popular demand.

Even in the early 1960's, more than 60 cultural groups of various kinds visited Latin America, although the major portion of these later groups went to Cuba.¹⁸ However, the same factors which virtually halted Latin visits to China also had the same effect in Chinese visits to the Southern Hemisphere. By 1965, Chinese delegation visits fell to one, which went to Mexico in connection with a cultural exhibit held there.¹⁹

The resurgence of a less hostile attitude has once again brought Chinese delegations to Latin America. "Ping-Pong" diplomats were on the road once again.

CHINESE PRESS AND RADIO ACTIVITIES

In addition to their guided tourist approach, the Chinese have made ample use of the printed page and radio broadcasts to present their views in Latin America. Diverse works by Chinese have been circulated in Spanish, Portuguese, French and English.

The first pamphlet in Spanish was published by the Peking Foreign Languages Press in 1954, a reprint of the People's Republic

¹⁸ Red Chinese Infiltration Into Latin America, p. 41.

¹⁹ United States Information Service, Office of Policy and Research, Communist Propaganda Organizations and Activities in Latin America During 1966 (Washington: n. p., 1967), p. 67.

of China constitution. The next year, six new Spanish titles were published. Nine new books made their appearance in 1956, and continued growth followed. By the beginning of 1959, at least 60 books and periodicals had been published in Spanish. By 1960, the majority of books published in English by the Chinese were also available in Spanish.²⁰

The Chinese were equally active in publishing periodicals targeted toward Latin America. China: revista ilustrada was the first to appear in Spanish, in 1956, although English language periodicals from China were already circulating there. A Spanish version of China Reconstructs, China Reconstruye, appeared in 1960. A Spanish edition of China's premier intellectual publication, Peking Review, made its appearance in 1963.²¹

Although the Chinese seemed strangely reluctant to publish in Portuguese, especially in view of their aspirations in Brazil, Portuguese translations of important Chinese works were made by several publishing houses in Latin America. Spanish versions of Chinese documents were also published and distributed, usually by local communist publishing firms.

²⁰Ratliff, "Chinese Communist Cultural Diplomacy" pp. 69-70.

²¹Cultural Relations Programs, p. 71.

Prior to the shift to a line of People's War, Chinese publications were widely available in Latin America. For example, the catalog of a Uruguayan Communist publisher listed over 300 Chinese works available in 1960.²² About two-thirds of these were political in nature.

Early distribution abroad was handled primarily by re-distribution points and directly from Peking. After the establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba, distribution from there and from several other Latin American points became common. This task was often handled by the New China News Agency. Use of these re-mail points facilitated circulation, as several Latin countries banned the import of communist materials, and others, due to lack of formal representation, were difficult to penetrate.

Chinese shipment of publications abroad took a sharp dip in November 1959, probably due to a shortage of newsprint, but soon resumed an upward trend.²³

The commotion surrounding the Sino-Soviet split created distribution problems for the Chinese, particularly with the worsening of relations with Cuba, but alternate channels were found, such as the newly-formed pro-Chinese splinter parties, to continue widespread dissemination.

²²Ratliff, "Chinese Communist Cultural Diplomacy," p. 71.

²³Cultural Relations Programs, p. 79.

Improving relations and the establishment of diplomatic ties have made the Chinese task easier in recent years. Close ties with Chile and Peru, as well as other points, such as Mexico, have enabled the Chinese to increase their distribution of a now much-more palatable product. For example, Uruguay was receiving 6,000 Chinese books a month in late 1971.²⁴ As many as 20 periodicals in Spanish and eight in Portuguese were being regularly published by the People's Republic in the same year.²⁵

In addition to the material received from abroad and that published by local communist presses, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Latin American countries has allowed the Chinese to distribute certain items directly from their embassies. Official releases, news summaries, and similar items are published and distributed daily, sometimes through a New China News Agency representative, elsewhere through the cultural affairs officer at the embassy.

Chinese radio broadcasts to Latin America were initiated in Spanish in 1957, with a broadcast schedule of seven hours per week. This was soon expanded, and by 1970 totaled twenty-one hours a

²⁴Ibid., p. 180.

²⁵Ibid., p. 202.

week in Spanish, as well as ten and one-half hours in Portuguese, which was introduced that year. China was not in a favorable geographic position to obtain the best radio coverage of Latin America until 1963, when, as a result of the Sino-Soviet split, Peking's ally, Albania, concluded an agreement with China to complete radio broadcast transmission facilities started and then abandoned by the Soviets. This the Chinese agreed to do, in return for a quid pro quo in which the Chinese obtained relay rights for their international broadcasts through Tirana.²⁶ Additional facilities were later constructed that made Albania the second ranking communist broadcaster in Europe.

Weekly hours of broadcasting continued to grow during the mid-60's and later. In 1965, China was broadcasting a total of 38½ hours weekly to Latin America. This increased to 56 hours in 1966, and to 70 hours in 1967. By 1971, China's transmitters were beaming 128½ program hours per week at Latin America.

Obviously, radio broadcasting to Latin America has been a growth industry for the Chinese. Needless to say, the appeals voiced by these broadcasts support the current Chinese line, and have shifted emphasis to support of nationalist against imperialists, in line with Peking's present foreign policy toward Latin America.

²⁶Ibid., p. 104.

TABLE 7

WEEKLY HOURS OF INTERNATIONAL
BROADCASTING BY CHINA TO LATIN AMERICA

<u>LANGUAGE</u>	<u>PROGRAM HOURS</u>			
	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1971</u>
Portuguese	10:30	28:00	14:00	14:00
Spanish	28:00	28:00	28:00	44:30
Cantonese			14:00	14:00
English			14:00	42:00
Mandarin				14:00
Totals	38:30	56:00	70:00	128:30

Source: Data derived from Communist Propaganda Activities in Latin America 1966 and 1967, p. 54 and 22, respectively, and Cultural Relations Programs, p. 124. Totals do not include New China News Agency news file broadcasts, also beamed in Spanish to Latin America.

FILMS

Chinese Communist movies first appeared in Latin America during 1952. During the most of this early period, they were usually shown only in private homes and in a few bi-national centers that had been established. Later, there were some well-attended public showings, such as Bolivia in 1959 and Ecuador in 1960.²⁷ During the cultural revolution, all theatrical activity, including films, became exceedingly controversial, and Chinese output fell to very low levels. Lately, at least some efforts have been made to revive film exports. The establishment of diplomatic relations has enabled the new embassies to show some films in Latin America, almost all with transparent propaganda content. An early film exchange agreement (1964) with Mexico does not seem to have had much effect.²⁸

BI-NATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

Another technique employed by the Chinese to promote individual and collective contact with Latin America has been the binational association. These associations, composed primarily

²⁷Ratliff, "Chinese Communist Cultural Diplomacy," p. 74.

²⁸Cultural Relations Programs, p. 220 and 229.

pro-Peking sympathizers in the host nation, promote travel to China, serve as hosts for visiting China, provide propaganda outlets for such items as lectures and films and help generate support for Peking's objectives. Usually there is a counterpart organization in China, although often it is a paper organization, activated only when needed.²⁹

The first such association was formed in 1952 in Chile followed in 1953 by Mexico and Brazil.³⁰ A spurt of interest in the early 1960's resulted in associations being formed in Argentina, Bolivia, Columbia, Costa Rica, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.³¹ None were particularly successful for any period of time, with the possible exception of the Chilean-Chinese Cultural Institute. Disenchantment with China's hard line and local government repression caused many to lapse into dissuetude during the mid-60's. As of 1972, only those in Chile, Columbia, Cuba, Mexico, and Peru were showing any signs of life.³²

²⁹Ibid., pp. 276-277.

³⁰Ratliff, "Chinese Communist Cultural Diplomacy," p. 75.

³¹Cultural Relations Programs, p. 27.

³²Ibid., pp. 287-292.

TABLE 8
LATIN AMERICAN-CHINESE FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATIONS - 1972

COUNTRY	STATUS	REMARKS
Argentina-China Friendship Association	Inactive	
Bolivia-China Cultural Association	Inactive	
Brazil-China Cultural Association	Inactive	
Chile-China Cultural Institute	Active	Branches in Santiago, Valparaiso, Concepcion, Los Angeles, and Temuco
Columbia-China Friendship Association	Active	Two branches
Costa Rica-China Friendship Committee	Inactive	
Mexico-China Friendship Association	Active	Two different groups with association
Peru-China Friendship Association	Inactive to date	
Uruguay-China Friendship Association		Two organizations of uncertain activity
Friends of China Society in Venezuela	Inactive	

Source: Cultural Relations Programs, pp. 287-292.

Counterpart roles in China were played by the China-Latin American Friendship Association, an umbrella type group formed in 1960, and by various bi-national counterparts to the Latin groups.³³

Although current information is not available, it is interesting to note that three of six New China News Agency (NCNA) directors and deputy directors prior to the 1966 Cultural Revolution held concurrent positions in China-Latin American associations. Wu Heng-si, former New China News Agency director, was also deputy chairman of the China-Latin American Friendship Association. Chu Mu-chih, currently New China News Agency director, was a deputy chairman of the China-Cuba Friendship Association. Teng Kang, another former deputy director, was also a member of the China-Latin American Friendship Association. New China News Agency staffers have been in the forefront of Chinese cultural overtures to Latin America.³⁴

ASSESSMENT OF PEOPLE TO PEOPLE PROGRAMS

Chinese emphasis on cultural diplomacy, and their success in those efforts, has accurately mirrored broad Chinese foreign

³³Ibid., pp. 293-94.

³⁴Liu, op. cit., p. 133-34.

policy objectives. During the period prior to 1960, the Chinese relied on a flexible appeal to nationalism and on the cultivation of almost any contact that could be made in Latin America. During this early period, Chinese ambitions as a nation-state outweighed ideological considerations, and made the pursuit of cultural diplomacy attractive.³⁵

Equally important, the Chinese stance had several features that appealed to Latins. China was an exotic country, and many were curious about it. China's efforts at building a "new" nation from an underdeveloped, peasant base also had appeal, as many Latins could see numerous parallels between their own countries and China. Chinese appeals to nationalism also attracted latent and not-so-latent "anti-imperialists," who felt that anyone so anti-United States could not be all bad. In addition, the political climate in several Latin countries was propitious for openings to the left, opening which allowed if not encouraged the dissemination of Chinese propaganda appeals. Thus, Chinese cultural diplomacy was generally a resounding success during that period.

³⁵Jane S. Little, "Appeals to the National Bourgeoisie: The Soft Line in Practice," in John D. Montgomery and Albert D. Hirschman, eds., Public Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 84.

Shifts in Chinese foreign policy after 1960 made cultural diplomacy an impossible task. The militancy displayed by the Chinese toward their old mentor, the Soviet Union, served to disillusion many. Chinese failures at home, such as the disastrous Great Leap Forward, also lessened Chinese appeal. Fear of Chinese revolutionary doctrine as promulgated by "People's War" also had its effect, as Latin governments tightened up on all communist efforts. The closeness of Castro swung many leftists to a pro-Cuban, not pro-Chinese position, and China's bitter dispute with both Castro and the Kremlin seriously reduced any effectiveness local leftists might have had in her behalf. Later, the crisis of the Cultural Revolution resulted in international mirth directed at the People's Republic, as well as causing her to shut off what contacts remained.

Only with a renewed diplomatic effort did cultural diplomacy regain both its respectability and the organizational effectiveness to operate. Chinese initiatives since late 1969 have re-established a climate where people to people programs could operate effectively. Recognition of state-to-state interests were essential to such a program, and the post-Cultural Revolution foreign policy line has clearly reflected China's interests as a nation-state, not her interests as an ideologue.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS: THE MODEL REVISITED

At the beginning of this thesis, a model was developed which stressed the operation of the People's Republic of China foreign policy on three levels in its interface with non-communist Latin American nations. Those three levels were: (1) Party to party relationships; (2) State to state relationships; and (3) People to people (cultural diplomacy) relationships.

This model, which depicted state interaction as that of monoliths (state to state); as directed at a specific target within that monolith (party to party); and as a diffuse target comprising key components of the monolith (people to people programs), conceptualized the People's Republic of China as the actor, and the Southern Hemisphere nations as the stage upon which various scenes were played. Due to the special nature of the relationship, no attempt was made to analyze Chinese-Cuban relations, except as they impacted elsewhere in Latin America.

On the assumption that such a model had some validity in the examination of the People's Republic of China's foreign policy toward Latin America, several hypotheses were drawn:

These were:

(1) If People's Republic of China-Latin America state to state relationships increase, then party to party relationships will decrease.

(2) Obversely, if People's Republic of China-Latin American state to state relationships deteriorate, then party to party relationships will increase.

(3) If state to state relations increase, then there will be an increase in people to people programs.

(4) Obversely, if party to party relationships increase, then there will be a decrease in people to people programs.

In light of the model, these hypotheses, and of the material presented, what conclusions can be drawn about People's Republic of China-Latin American relationships?

It would seem that the history of Chinese relations with Latin American from the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1948 to the present can be conveniently divided into three phases. The first phase covered that period from 1948 to a point somewhere in the early 1960's, but certainly ended with the Chinese letter of June 15, 1963, in which the Chinese smashed their already splintered ideological front with the Soviet Union.

The second period, a period of Chinese belligerency, extended from that point to another point in time which can

roughly be estimated at some time in 1970, but definitely ending immediately prior to China's entry into the United Nations.

The third period is the present era of Chinese-Latin American relationships, marked by an expanding diplomatic presence and support of foreign policy goals dear to the hearts of many Latin Americans.

Although these three periods can be rather clearly discerned, it should not be supposed that all Chinese actions were predicated on different goals during each of the periods, or that Chinese actions in one period were suddenly and massively reversed at the beginning of the next. It takes time in even such an authoritarian nation as the People's Republic of China to change the course of foreign policy, and to orchestrate all the sub-changes that must be effected to support a new or revised line.¹

ASSESSMENT OF THE HYPOTHESES

What then of the hypotheses that have been made earlier?

The evidence examined supports conclusions for each as follows:

¹See, for example of continued, although decreased interest in Pro-Chinese communist parties, the greetings to the Communist Party of Brazil published in Peking Review, No. 7-8, February 25, 1972, p. 5.

The first hypothesis stated that if People's Republic of China-Latin American relationships were to increase, then party to party relationships would decrease. Even a cursory examination of the record supports such a conclusion. The high point of Chinese-Latin American Communist party interactions occurred coincidental with the period in which China's foreign policy was most ideological. The recent and dramatic increase in state to state relationship has seen China's interest in her communist comrades in that area relegated to second place.

Why? Several reasons, and combination of reasons, come readily to mind: Most important are:

- (1) Change in China's international priorities.
- (2) The nature of most Latin American governments.
- (3) The basic dichotomy which exists between the world view of Latin America ruling elites and Chinese communist ideology.

During the period when China showed the most interest in Latin communist parties, a principal motivator in Chinese foreign policy was the need and desire to attain leadership in the Socialist camp. Soviet hegemony was the target, and Soviet leadership of the world communist movement was the objective to be taken. Such a struggle was clearly ideological in nature. Ideological friends could most readily be found in the Marxist-Leninist camp. Indeed,

the ideological nature of the contest placed non-Marxists beyond the pale, relegated to the role of bystanders and enemies.

China's international posture shifted from that of an ideologue to that of a nation-state at the close of the Cultural Revolution. Non-communist governments were no longer an object of scorn and ridicule, particularly if some ground of mutual interest could be found. A nation that could establish diplomatic relations with Ethiopia, as China did, was certainly one in which more than ideology was shaping foreign policy.

Also, the very nature of most Latin American governments in the post World War II era has limited China's ability to emphasize both state to state and party to party approaches at the same time. Generally conservative, often military, and highly nationalistic, these governments could see little purpose in diplomatic activities with a China that was loudly supporting their enemies on the left. Fear of People's War was not only confined to the Pentagon or Foggy Bottom. The most likely recipients of such a strategy also were fearful, and with good cause.

Closely related to the above was another factor requiring the Chinese to de-emphasize party relationships if it were to improve state relationships, although the Chinese did not seem to perceive the differences during the height of massive support for People's

War. Latin America was and is not China. Culturally, socially, demographically, the differences were more apparent to most Latins than the similarities. Latin America, with regional variations, was increasingly urban and increasingly industrialized. For the Chinese to continue to support parties that advocated the Chinese model and at the same time normalize state relations would seem too much to bear. Mutual statesmanship required Chinese abandonment of much of the ideological baggage of which many Latins could characterize as ridiculous or at the best, not appropriate to their needs. Thus, rules of logic as well as politics required a reduction in support for Latin American communists favorable to Peking if other, and more immediately important, Chinese objectives were to be attained.

The obverse hypothesis appears equally valid. That hypothesis stated that if state to state relations deteriorate, party to party relations will increase. Many of the factors in the foregoing explanation, when reversed, are equally applicable here. A deterioration in relations assumes an antagonism between the two parties. If such an antagonism exists, and of course depending on its degree, there is no need to respect the diplomatic niceties of international relations, no need to court favor in the other camp, and indeed, even a decrease in any requirement to accurately assess the opposition's actions in any realistic light.

Ipso facto, everything the antagonist does is wrong and motivated by fear and greed. Such a typology has been a hallmark of both Soviet and Chinese foreign policy pronouncements during periods of tension with the West.

On the other hand, such antagonisms require that friends be found who will act to help one side, even if that help has little effect on the international scene, but serves only to hinder the opponent on his home ground. During the period of the 1960's, the Chinese viewed Moscow's domination of Latin Communist Parties as a home ground fertile for disruption; while at the same time casting Latin governments as servile lackeys of United States imperialism. Given the nature of these parties and governments, the only possible leverage the Chinese could exert existed within Latin Communist parties and the Jacobin left which swam in the same pool.

The validity of hypotheses three and four is less apparent than for one and two, discussed above. These latter two hypotheses proposed that if state to state relations increase, then there will be an increase in people to people programs, and obversely, that a deterioration in state relations would decrease people to people programs. In discussing these two hypotheses, it is important to note that cultural programs serve only as a weapon to implement other, and more basic, foreign policy goals.

The chronological record that has been depicted heretofore would certainly support the assertion that periods of high emphasis on people to people programs has coincided with periods of high state to state emphasis. The peak of Chinese cultural diplomacy was reached about 1960, in an era when the Chinese were strenuously wooing Latin American states. That this courtship was not immediately consummated should not obscure the fact that it was taking place. Overall, the early (approximately 1948-1961) period was one of relatively amiable relations between many Latin American nations and Peking. Obviously, some measure of comity is necessary to make any cultural relations program a success, and the Chinese program during that period was indeed a success.

In further support of these hypotheses, it has been shown that during the subsequent period of hostility at the state to state level, with the concomitant increase in party to party relations, there was a drastic decrease in people to people programs involving personal interchange, even though impersonal propaganda activities increased.

This can be viewed as a natural outcome of the earlier hypotheses. If state to state relations have deteriorated, host governments are not inclined to support the exchange of people who can be then used by the opposition as convenient carriers of

whatever horrendous malignancy by which the other side is infested. Sharp antagonism between nations causes reduction in contacts, and this antagonism was apparent during the period the Chinese were espousing their championship of People's War. Cultural interchange requires a balmy international climate, not the Arctic blasts of ideological invective that were so prominent during this period.

The final hypothesis stated that if party to party relationships increase, then there will be a decrease in people to people programs. This hypothesis rests heavily on the first two. If hypotheses one and two are true, that is, an increase in party relations can be manifested only with a decrease in state relations, then it should follow that this hypothesis is also correct. However, it must be remembered that the basic assumption is one of relations between non-communist Latin nations and a People's Republic of China with its roots deep in the tenets of Marxism-Leninism. In view of the recent historical record in Latin America, the success of this hypothesis would depend on the viewer's categorization of the now-departed Allende regime in Chile. If that regime, with wide support from leftist, but not necessarily communist elements, were categorized as non-communist, then the hypothesis seems to fail. All three levels of Chinese policy implementation seemed to be at work in Chile. There was Chinese support, albeit reluctantly, for the progressive nature of the Allende regime, an

increase in cultural exchange, and indications of support for pro-Peking elements in the various political groups supporting him.

However, it is this writer's view that the Allende regime, unique in its accession to power through the ballot box, was a sport in communist heredity. Its "non-communist" nature was due to its failure to consolidate all power in itself, and not to any non-communist inclinations of its leaders. It was flawed fruit of the communist tree, and its flaw was to prove fatal. This flaw concerned the Chinese as an ideological heresy, one that if Allende had continued in power might have provided additional support for hypothesis three and four.

Even so, the evidence presented does not seem to offer conclusive proof of the third and fourth hypotheses, although the preponderance of evidence seems to support them. Such substantiation may be forthcoming as a few more years give added perspective to the question.

OTHER FINDINGS

What other insights can be drawn concerning Chinese-Latin American relations? The first, and perhaps the most important, is that Chinese foreign policy toward Latin America has had its motivation outside of merely a Sino-Latin sphere. Motivated in its

early years by fear of the Western imperialist, China attempted to win friends to use against them. Later, the doctrine of People's War hinged to a large extent in China's growing ideological and national interest differences with the Soviet Union. Her current resurgence on the diplomatic scene in Latin America is also a by-blow of events elsewhere. Without her desire to challenge the globe girdling hegemony of both the Soviet Union and the United States as a nation-state equal, and her developing detente with the United States, which opened previously closed Latin doors, her current diplomatic offense could not have occurred, let alone succeeded.

Early in this thesis it was stated that perhaps ideology had been the most important factor in the development of Chinese policy. Certainly ideological content has been a constant presence in that foreign policy, whether directed at Latin America or elsewhere. However, as has been shown, it was an ideology that conveniently and whole-heartedly served Chinese interests as a nation-state. Ideological fervor has been coupled with a realistic assessment of Chinese aims and chances for success. Even during the shrillest outpourings of the call for People's War, the Chinese offered little but propaganda support to her hopeful friends in Latin America.

Despite the jingoist propaganda, Chinese actions have been basically conservative, and not lightly undertaken. Overall, her Latin American policy has reflected the perpetuation of Chinese self-interest, albeit a self-interest "enlightened" by the uniquely Maoist interpretations of Marx and Lenin.

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